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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a book, a DVD, a CD or a video game packaged 
with a notice stating that the user had the perpetual right to 
enjoy this book, this film, this music album or this game for 
their personal use only.  Is such a notice legally binding?1  If 
the user ignored that notice and sold the item on eBay, would 
there be repercussions?  Although the answer to that specific 
question is not known yet, the operative word in the 
preceding clause is “yet.”  For, if the “personal use” notice was 
couched as an “agreement,”—more commonly known in the 
digital commercial world as an “end user license 
agreement,”—and if it contained a few more phrases than 
“personal use only,”—such as clauses specifying restrictions 
on title—there is now circuit court authority suggesting that 
publishers, music producers and other content producers 
effectively may control the secondary markets for commercial 
distribution. 
Anticipating this possibly cataclysmic outcome, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”),2 a digital rights 
advocacy group, recently warned that a “dangerous decision” 
would permit copyright owners to use “a few ‘magic words’ in 
a license agreement” to deprive consumers of their traditional 
rights to sell, borrow or donate copyrighted materials.3  This 
 1. See Nate Anderson, Universal: You don’t own those promotional CDs we 
gave you, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 9, 2008, 10:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/ 
tech-policy/news/2008/04/universal-tossing-that-promo-cd-violates-ourrights.ars 
(Fred Von Lohmann, copyright attorney, formerly at EFF, stated, “CDs, books, 
DVDs, and video games could be festooned with ‘notices’ that erode a customer’s 
first sale, fair use, and other rights.”) (emphasis added) (last visited Jan. 21, 
2011). 
 2. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2011). 
 3. Corynne McSherry, “Magic Words” Trump User Rights: Ninth Circuit 
Ruling in Vernor v. Autodesk, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,  
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dangerous decision was the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, Vernor v. 
Autodesk,4 issued on September 10, 2010, which determined 
that Timothy Vernor infringed Autodesk’s software copyright 
when he attempted to sell a copy of Autodesk software on 
eBay.5  Vernor had purchased an authentic copy of the 
software from a company who, in turn, had purchased it 
directly from Autodesk.6  The license agreement attached to 
the software, however, restricted its use to the initial 
purchaser and prohibited further transfer without Autodesk’s 
express permission.7 
Prior to Vernor v. Autodesk, Ninth Circuit district courts 
were split on the question of the application of copyright law’s 
first sale doctrine in the context of software licensing 
transactions.8  All three district court decisions involved the 
same software producer, Adobe, with two decisions favoring 
Adobe and one against it.9  If one includes software decisions 
on the related copyright doctrines of fair use and essential 
copying, the upshot is that decisions adjudicating licensing 
disputes have lined up decisively in favor of the software 
producers.10  The implications here are important because 
while the commercial practice and the court decisions have 
been confined to software, even the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged the broad application of the principles stated in 
its decision, Vernor v. Autodesk, to digital media generally, 
including DVDs and CDs.11 
These trends have not been lost on scholars.  
Commentators have argued for some time that overreaching 
software producers have attempted to “contract around” and 
otherwise eliminate statutory privileges, including first sale 
that a copyright user should enjoy.12  In general the courts 
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/magic-words-trump-user-
rights-ninth-circuit-ruling. 
 4. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 5. See id. at 1111, 1116. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 73–96 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Vernor II, 621 F.3d at 1115.  Cf. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 
628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 12. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy 
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 
1890 (2010) (Carver notes that there is a “larger debate concerning whether 
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have not been persuaded by the commentary, as the courts 
found these end user license agreements (also called shrink 
wrap, mass market, referred to herein as EULA or EULAs) 
enforceable and not preempted by federal copyright law.13  
Thus, the weight of opinion among scholars has been critical 
of pro-software decisions whereas the weight of decisions 
culminating with the recent Ninth Circuit decision has 
favored the software producer.14 
Why are the courts so unpersuaded by this commentary?  
Scholars have been distracted by the contract critique and 
have failed to expose the underlying theoretical dialectic in 
copyright.  This Article attempts to reframe the debate by 
focusing the discussion on the underlying copyright theories 
competing in the conflicting decisions.  One aim of this 
discussion is to provide greater coherency to the underlying 
rationales of the decisions.  The normative objective is to 
propose adjustments to the first sale doctrine of copyright to 
ameliorate the potential negative effects of the current trend. 
The pro-software producer decisions are best justified as 
a product of the “property rights” paradigm of copyright, 
grounded in natural rights and economic theory.  The 
“property rights” paradigm supports a very narrow 
construction of the first sale doctrine or in Professor 
Goldstein’s characterization of the “copyright optimists,” 
mass consumer contracts should trump the policies embodied in statutory 
schemes enacted by Congress . . . . [B]oilerplate [end-user license agreements] 
that purport to restrict rights [that users of copyrighted works] have grown 
accustomed to . . . and [that] Congress intended they have as part of its larger 
effort to craft a balanced Copyright Act.”); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property 
and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1995) (Lemley claimed 
that “[s]oftware vendors are attempting en masse to ‘opt out’ of intellectual 
property law by drafting license provisions that compel their customers to 
adhere to more restrictive provisions than copyright (and even patent) law 
would require.”); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies 
and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157, 185–86 
(1990) (“The antitrust issue, then may reduce to whether it is reasonable to 
leverage copyright by contract to establish suprastatutory liability . . . . [T]he 
answer seems clear that what is involved is the contractual expansion of a 
limited statutory monopoly.”). 
 13. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Car 
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993); 
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990); Acorn 
Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 14. See infra notes 73–96 and accompanying text.  
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perhaps no first sale doctrine at all.15  On the other side, the 
decisions against the software producer found limits on the 
ability of the copyright holder to control the distribution of its 
creative works.  In this context, “limits” means the ability (or 
restraint on the ability) of the copyright holder to retain title 
to its copyrighted work (e.g., DVD or CD) after placing it in 
the stream of commerce. 
The “traditional incentives” school of thought advocates 
greater access to these creative works and a broad 
construction of the first sale doctrine.16  Adherents of this 
school of thought argue that if the consumer has indefinite 
possession of the DVD, or other cultural product, and has 
paid full price (no other payments are due) then this should 
be characterized as a sale for purposes of copyright’s first sale 
doctrine.  If the court upheld the user’s right to transfer the 
cultural product (e.g., DVD) then it is placing “limits” on the 
copyright holder’s (content producers) ability to control 
distribution of its copyrighted products.  The current majority 
rule, as expressed in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernor v. 
Autodesk, runs contrary to this view and supports the ability 
of the copyright holder to unilaterally dictate the terms of 
downstream distribution of its copyrighted works. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces the 
analytical framework to illustrate the dialectic tension 
between the “traditional incentives” strand of utilitarian 
theory of copyright and the “property rights” paradigm, the 
product of another strand of utilitarian theory with natural 
rights philosophy.  These competing approaches to the 
justification of copyright inform and influence the divergent 
outcomes of the software decisions.  This section provides the 
context for the main argument that the rise of the “property 
rights” rationale in the judicial doctrine, both implied and 
expressed, is displacing the “traditional incentives” rationale, 
as seen in the recent pro-software producer decisions.  Where 
the “traditional incentives” justification for copyright law 
addresses the balance between the protection afforded to the 
copyright holder and the public’s access to copyrighted works, 
 15. See infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.  Professor Goldstein 
introduced the “celestial jukebox,” a metaphor for the ideal “property rights” 
model of digital dissemination of content.  In this model, consumers can 
purchase content but have no ability to transfer that content to third parties. 
 16. See infra Part I.B.6. 
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the “property rights” rationale focuses on the benefit to 
societal welfare derived from maximal control of the works by 
the copyright holder. 
The second section of Part I provides further contextual 
background to the contemporary software first sale decisions 
that influenced the courts and commentators.  The early 
judicial and legislative treatment of software contributed to 
the misplaced emphasis by the courts on flawed contract 
reasoning and weak statutory construction, rather than a 
coherent copyright analysis.  These areas included: (a) the on-
going debate throughout the 1990s of the efforts of the 
software industry to create a special statutory scheme in the 
UCC to establish default rules for software transactions 
consistent with their interests, including non-alienability of 
software products; (b) the problem of borrowing from the 
statutory construction of § 117 on essential copying of 
software to inform the construction of the term “owner” in § 
109’s first sale doctrine; (c) early software decisions that 
established a pattern of turning to the UCC to interpret 
EULAs and potential conflicts with copyright; and (d) 
academic commentary’s misplaced emphasis on the UCC and 
contract preemption. 
Part II argues that the pro-software decisions are more 
justifiably explained by tracing their heritage to several 
earlier decisions involving not only software but also other 
content, film prints and children’s toys.  These pre-digital 
“heritage” decisions represent an important link to the later 
rise of the “property rights” paradigm of copyright.  These 
decisions evidence an “inherent rights” doctrine of copyright 
ownership derived from natural rights theory of copyright.  
The “inherent rights” doctrine of these heritage decisions 
informs the natural rights branch of the “property rights” 
paradigm; the other branch being the utilitarian strand of 
economic theory inspired by the work of Professor Harold 
Demsetz.  By tracing the influence of “inherent rights” 
doctrine of the heritage decisions on the current “property 
rights” model, the underlying copyright rationale at work in 
these contemporary pro-software decisions becomes visible.  
The “property rights” model provides a more coherent 
rationale for these contemporary pro-software outcomes, 
rather than the flawed contract analysis and weak statutory 
construction expressed in the opinions. 
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Part III analyzes the line of decisions finding against the 
software producer in the context of the original principles of 
the first sale doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
its decision, Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.17  The rationale of these 
decisions, both express and implied, supports the “traditional 
incentives” model of drawing a limit on the power of the 
copyright holder to retain title to copyrighted works after 
they have been placed in the stream of commerce.  These 
limits are intended to ensure the benefits of availability and 
accessibility of creative works to the society at large.  The 
limits are invoked by courts when they resist the 
characterization by copyright holders of its distribution as 
something other than a sale when the principles of rightful 
possession have been met, namely indefinite possession and 
full price.  At the moment, however, this is the minority view 
of the courts, and arguably has been overruled by precedent 
of Ninth Circuit in its recent decision in Vernor v. Autodesk. 
Finally the Article proposes a model of “constructive 
ownership,” drawn from the “rightful possessor” theory of 
ownership as articulated by the minority view, which includes 
the Bobbs-Merrill principles of “full dominion” and 
“satisfactory price.”  However, the model adds a third 
dependent prong for the special case of software.  A central 
tenet of this Article is that judicial doctrine has evolved to 
accommodate software and in the process it has distorted the 
important principles of Bobbs-Merrill with respect to the first 
sale doctrine.  This model allows for the special case of 
software if certain conditions are met, namely a continuing 
license of intellectual property.  This model, if adopted by the 
courts, would limit the Ninth Circuit decision in Vernor v. 
Autodesk to software (assuming it met the conditions of the 
model) but not apply the decision to other digital media.  The 
theory and rationale of the “traditional incentives” model 
forms the best fit with the progenitor first sale decision, 
Bobbs-Merrill, and fulfills those promises made over a 
century ago. 
 17. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Analytical Framework of Competing Copyright Theories 
As argued in this Article, the unifying theme that lends 
coherence to the pro-software (content) producer decisions on 
the one hand and the decisions finding against the software 
(content) producer on the other hand, lies in an analysis and 
understanding of the divergent theoretical views for the 
justification of copyright law.  The scholarly debate and the 
dominant critique of the pro-software decisions focuses on the 
courts’ express reasoning for its outcomes, which have been 
based on contract analysis and statutory construction.18  The 
implied reasoning of the pro-software decisions and the 
express reasoning of the pre-digital “heritage” first sale 
decisions favoring content producers are both derivative of 
the “property rights” paradigm of copyright.  The recent 
decisions finding against the software producer on first sale 
reveal some express reasoning which relies on the “traditional 
incentives” model of copyright; however their persuasive 
authority is diluted, it is argued, by a similar distraction of 
flawed contract reasoning and misplaced statutory 
construction.  The “property rights” paradigm and the 
“traditional incentives” model of copyright are explained 
below. 
The U.S. intellectual property regime has traditionally 
been viewed as justified by a utilitarian view that granting 
copyright and patent protection for works and inventions 
promotes social welfare.19  As Peter Menell claimed in his 
article, Intellectual Property: General Theories, “[t]he 
utilitarian framework has been particularly central to the 
development of copyright law in the United States.”20 
 18. See infra Part I.B.6. 
 19. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic 
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1980 (2006) 
(“Utilitarianism is the predominant copyright justification in the United States, 
as evidenced by the Copyright Clause’s affording protection for a limited time as 
an economic incentive to create.”). 
 20. Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 
ENCYLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 129, 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit 
de Geist eds., 2000); cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary 
Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1023 
(1990).  Professor Ginsburg argues against the conventional conception of a neat 
divide between the origins of the two systems, namely a utilitarian conception 
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The consensus breaks down at the definition of social 
welfare and the precise mechanism, i.e., amount and type of 
protection, to achieve that optimal social welfare.21  A major 
strand of utilitarian theory, arguably the dominant one in 
academic circles, posits that the level of protection can 
increase too far causing deadweight losses from monopoly 
exploitation.22  Scholarship following this view has referred to 
the “delicate balance” embodied in copyright law and policy 
between protecting the rights of the content producers on the 
one hand, and ensuring the access and availability of the 
creative works to the public both for improver rights and 
for the U.S., and natural rights basis for France.  Id. at 994–95.  Rather the 
systems were influenced by both bases of copyright justification.  Id. at 1000, 
1012–13.  In her conclusion, she noted that “the characteristic modern portrayal 
of French revolutionary copyright as an unambiguous espousal of an author-
centric view of copyright requires substantial amendment,” and that “familiar 
conceptions of early U.S. copyright also warrant reconsideration.”  Id. at 1023.  
If U.S. copyright’s exponents sought to promote the progress of knowledge, they 
also recognized that the author’s labors are due their own reward.”  Id.  
Professor Paul Goldstein similarly argued that natural rights theory has 
influenced copyright in the U.S. (and England) but he would call it “practical 
intuition and economic analysis” that have produced the “same prescription that 
natural rights theory has produced on the Continent.”  PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 178–79 
(1994).  In his classic work on copyright, Professor Benjamin Kaplan’s intimated 
that the influence of the “natural rights” theory was at work in Judge Learned 
Hand’s decision in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Picture Corp., where the plaintiff 
argued that its play had been infringed by the film producer defendant. 
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1966).  In his 
criticism of the decision, Kaplan stated, “I reflected that if man has any ‘natural’ 
rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus reap where 
he has not sown.  Education after all proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and 
‘progress,’ if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence of 
copying.”  Id.  In his study of the origins of Britain’s Statute of Anne, the first 
copyright statute, and the model for the first U.S. copyright statute, Professor 
Mark Rose noted that the Statute of Anne curtailed the efforts of the London 
booksellers to transform their prior licensing privilege into a perpetual common 
law right of copyright.  MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF 
COPYRIGHT, 47–48 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).  It did not, as he noted, “settle 
the theoretical questions behind the notion of literary property.”  Id. 
 21. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 1, 14 (Stephen R. Munzer, ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2001). 
 22. See id. at 14–15 (Professor William Nordhaus applied classic monopoly 
economic theory to intellectual property to demonstrate that the monopoly 
model will price higher and produce less than in a free competition model; thus 
leading to the creation of a consumer surplus or “deadweight loss” of output 
unavailable to society.); Menell, supra note 20, at 133; William A. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325 (1989) [hereinafter An Economic Analysis]. 
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general dissemination of knowledge on the other.23  This 
balance has often been referred to as the “protection-access” 
paradigm.24 
In a different direction of scholarship, it has been argued 
that under a “property rights” theory more protection is 
justified to respond to the needs and wants of consumers in 
the marketplace and to encourage investment in the 
continuing availability of creative works.  Professor Fisher 
cited the work of 1960’s Chicago school economist, Harold 
Demsetz, for inspiring this school of thought which argued for 
strong property rights in intellectual property and relied on 
Coasean theory of bargaining as the most efficient method of 
allocating and distributing the fruits of the intellectual 
property regime in society.25  A basic assumption of this 
 23. Fisher, supra note 21, at 2; An Economic Analysis, supra note 22, at 326. 
 24. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV., 483, 492 (1996).  Within the “balance” group there 
have been variations depending on value norms around definition of societal 
value, and level of concern about the access side of the paradigm.  The economic 
theory model as espoused by Landes & Posner has been associated with a 
“strong rights” model because they have argued for “indefinite copyright.”  See 
Neil W. Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 20 (Fiona Macmillan ed., Edward Elgar 
Publ’g 2007).  In discussing these variations in his article, Theories of 
Intellectual Property, William Fisher, included Landes & Posner squarely in the 
incentives theory approach of intellectual property.  See Fisher, supra note 21, 
at 4.  Landes & Posner did not advocate absolute property rights for copyright 
holders.  Their “indefinite copyright” would consist of renewable short terms 
that they believed would have the effect of a) promoting greater investment in 
protected works and b) enlarging the public domain.  See William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 
517–18 (2003) [hereinafter Indefinitely Renewable Copyright].  More important 
to this discussion, they acknowledged that a balance must be struck between 
incentives and access to creative works, and have stated that “[s]triking the 
correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in 
copyright law.”  See An Economic Analysis, supra note 22, at 326.  In their 
analysis of maximal societal welfare they have argued for a broad construal of 
fair use and a narrow construal of “substantial similarity” standard for 
copyright infringement.  See Robin Elizabeth Herr, Is the Sui Generis Right a 
Failed Experiment? 66 (DJØF Publ’g 2008).  Another viewpoint on the question 
of “balance,” there are those scholars that William Fisher grouped (including 
himself) who fall in the category of social and institutional planning.  See 
Fisher, supra note 21, at 6–8.  A distinctive feature of this group particularly in 
comparison to Landes & Posner is the belief that societal welfare should be 
defined broader than in purely economic terms, e.g. creative expression, civic 
participation.  The unifying theme of both viewpoints is that they acknowledge 
and support some limits on the copyright holder’s power and control over its 
creative works for the benefit of the societal welfare. 
 25. See Fisher, supra note 21, at 15; Menell, supra note 20, at 133. 
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theory was that the copyright holder is best situated to 
control the allocation of its creative works.26  Another 
distinctive feature of this model is the mechanism of price 
discrimination as a critical tool for the copyright holder (asset 
owner) to maximize the efficient allocation of its creative 
works.  For example, a software producer may choose to 
discriminate in pricing its product, depending on the type of 
user (e.g., a non-commercial “home” user pays a lower price 
than a commercial “business” user).  The theory holds that 
this mechanism maximizes both optimal use of the product in 
society and profit to the asset owner. 
To illustrate Demsetz’s influence on legal theory, 
Professor Fisher quoted from Paul Goldstein’s invocation in 
his treatise, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the 
Celestial Jukebox: 
The logic of property rights dictates their extension into 
every corner in which people derive enjoyment and value 
from literary and artistic works. To stop short of these 
ends would deprive producers of the signals of consumer 
preference that trigger and direct their investments.27 
Although Professor Goldstein did not openly claim to be a 
“property rights” theorist who has abandoned or discredited 
the incentives theory camp, his sentiments seemed pretty 
clearly aligned with those he referred to as “copyright 
optimists.”  In the first chapter of his book entitled, The 
Metaphysics of Copyright, Professor Goldstein described 
“copyright optimists” as those “who assert . . . natural justice, 
entitling authors to every last penny that other people will 
pay to obtain copies of their works . . . . [T]hey view 
copyright’s cup of entitlement as always half full, only 
waiting to be filled still further.”28  A few pages later he 
succinctly noted that the “copyright optimists” rely on the 
“larger truth” of “natural rights” to support their view of the 
extension of copyright into every corner.29  Later in the book 
where Professor Demsetz’s work on property rights approach 
to intellectual property was introduced, Professor Goldstein 
concluded that such a view was consistent with not only “the 
 26. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18. 
 27. Fisher, supra note 21, at 15 (emphasis added); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
20, at 178–79 . 
 28. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 15. 
 29. Id. at 17. 
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same prescription that natural rights theory has produced on 
the Continent” but also with “two hundred years of practical 
intuition and economic analysis in England and the United 
States.”30  If there was any doubt regarding his sentiments 
they were dispelled by the penultimate sentence of his 
treatise: 
The main challenge will be to keep this trajectory clear of 
the buffets of protectionism and true to copyright’s historic 
logic that the best prescription for connecting authors to 
their audiences is to extend rights into every corner where 
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works.31 
The absence of any discussion of monopoly inefficiencies 
leads the reader to the conclusion that Professor Goldstein 
(again for himself or on behalf of the “copyright optimists”) 
rejected the incentive theory’s assumptions. Consistent with 
the property rights approach, he adhered to the belief that, 
similar to the assumptions in real property, the property 
owner (landowner or copyright holder) knows best how to 
allocate uses of property.32  There was also an implicit 
assumption in the “copyright optimists” argument that the 
boundaries of this property were clear and little concern 
about reliance of copyright systems on creations of others.33 
Professor Goldstein’s central metaphor of his treatise, the 
celestial jukebox, proves all allocation to society is solved by 
the technological wonders of the digital dissemination model.  
The “celestial jukebox” celebrated in Professor Goldstein’s 
treatise embraced the economic theory underlying the 
“property rights” paradigm, namely that price discrimination 
by the property owner will result in the optimal creation and 
allocation of the creative works.  The common denominator of 
the “property rights” group is the combination of the property 
motif and the markets mechanism.34  Similar to real property 
 30. Id. at 179. 
 31. Id. at 236. 
 32. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18. 
 33. Cf. Netanel, supra note 24, at 24 (discusses the influences on the 
“copyright as a natural right” rationale, including the 18th and 19th century 
Romantic ideal of the author as unique, a genius, “eschewing any imitation or 
reliance upon the work of others.”). 
 34. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18.  Professor Netanel provided a lucid 
discussion of the “copyright is property” rationale and its view that copyright “is 
primarily a mechanism for facilitating markets in existing expression” and can 
best serve that goal “when copyright owners have full proprietary control over 
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(arguably more than chattel), the concept of control over the 
property is vested in the landowner or copyright holder as the 
one best situated to make the determination regarding 
allocation and use of its resource.35  In addition the “property 
rights” paradigm, as illustrated by Professor Goldstein, also 
draws on natural rights philosophy for further justification of 
the maximal control of the asset by the copyright owner. 
In his article, Why Has Copyright Expanded?, Professor 
Netanel remarked that the influence of the “copyright is 
private property” group had increased with the support of the 
copyright industry.36  He traced their philosophical heritage 
to 18th century William Blackstone who argued for 
“perpetual exclusive rights” for author’s literary 
compositions.37  Professor Netanel claimed that this view 
conflicted with the main thrust of U.S. jurisprudence, citing 
many Supreme Court references to copyright as a “statutory 
monopoly” or “limited monopoly privilege.”38 
their works.”  Id.  As he explained, concentrating control of exclusive 
proprietary rights in a single owner facilitates the licensing and marketing 
strategies for the original work and any derivative works.  Id. 
 35. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 18.  Professor Netanel lumped the work of 
Landes & Posner with the “copyright is property” group; however, I argue, like 
Professor Fisher, that Landes & Posner’s viewpoint may exist on the 
conservative side of the “delicate balance” spectrum but they do subscribe to 
that view rather than the “property rights” view as discussed supra. 
 36. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 12. 
 37. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 21–22.  Professor Netanel discusses the 
“copyright as property” viewpoint separately from the “copyright as a natural 
right.”  Id. at 18, 21.  William Blackstone was an early advocate of natural 
rights jurisprudence.  It is worth noting that Blackstone developed his natural 
rights approach to copyright as a private attorney on behalf of his clients, 
private London booksellers.  Blackstone’s clients were attempting to establish a 
permanent common law right in literary property in the mid-18th century 
England in reaction to the passage of the Statute of Anne.  See ROSE, supra note 
20, at 75, 77–78, 88–89.  I analyze the “copyright as property” viewpoint as 
relying on “natural rights” theory for further support to its economic theory 
argument.  This view is also supported by Professor Goldstein’s treatise, 
Copyright Highway, which clearly combined a natural rights justification with a 
markets based, property rights theory in its holistic philosophy and approach to 
copyright law as expressed by Goldstein’s concept of the “copyright optimist” 
discussed supra.  GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20; supra notes 27–31 and 
accompanying text.  Goldstein does not directly cite William Blackstone 
although he does refer to the “practical intuition and economic analysis” of the 
past two hundred years in U.S. and England that has produced same 
prescription as natural rights theory on the Continent.  GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
20, at 178–79. 
 38. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 12.  Professor Netanel cited the Supreme 
Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) as stating that 
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Professor Netanel also noted that the receptiveness of 
lower courts and the legislature to the absolute proprietary 
model of intellectual property (including copyright) has been 
on the rise.39  He cited Judge Frank Easterbrook, author of 
the landmark ProCD v. Zeidenberg40 opinion, discussed infra, 
as a strong advocate for the property rights/market approach 
to intellectual property.  Judge Easterbrook wrote in his 
article Intellectual Property is Still Property that “except in 
the rarest case we should treat IP and physical property 
identically in the law,” supporting narrow exceptions to 
copyright.41  The ProCD opinion openly advocated the price 
discrimination model, consistent with the “property rights” 
paradigm, as a method of and justification for the property 
rights model.42  When Professor Goldstein published his 
initial treatise, Copyright’s Highway in 1994, he had written 
that “with few exceptions—most notably opinions written by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, decades ago—the Court’s 
attitude has been to treat copyright’s cup as half empty, not 
half full.”43  Professor Goldstein believed that the Supreme 
Court had drawn an imaginary line around the public’s home 
space immunizing the activity in the home from copyright 
infringement.44 
 
“copyrights are monopoly privileges that . . . while ‘intended to motivate . . . 
create activity . . . by provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature and 
must ultimately serve the public good.”); cf. see Netanel, supra note 24, at 18.  
Netanel cited work by Professor Merges that has criticized “incentive theory as 
‘crude’ and ‘two-dimensional.’ ”   Id. at 18 n.49. 
 39. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 13. 
 40. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see infra notes 80–84 
and accompanying text.  Netanel, supra note 24, at 13. 
 41. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990). 
 42. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449–50. 
 43. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 33. 
 44. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 202.  Goldstein’s work, Copyright’s 
Highway, was first published in 1994 following Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) but before MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  Sony held that private copying of television 
broadcasts by means of videotaping did not constitute infringement and was 
protected by fair use.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 423–24.  In Grokster, the Court found 
that private peer to peer file sharing of copyrighted music did constitute 
copyright infringement based on an inducement theory of contributory 
infringement.  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929–30.  Unlike Sony, neither the 
individuals nor the technology companies facilitating the “sharing” were 
immunized by fair use.  Id. 
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A great deal had changed between the first publication of 
Copyright’s Highway in 1994, and Professor Netanel’s article 
written in 2007.  The DMCA was passed in 1998, granting 
sweeping powers to copyright holders to prevent anti-
circumvention technologies on digital devices containing their 
copyrighted works, and the Supreme Court found that private 
sharing of copyrighted music without a license was 
infringement and commercial interests that facilitated such 
private copying could be found liable for secondary 
infringement.45  Congress seems to have become a “copyright 
optimist,” if not an increasing number of the courts.  This 
historical tension between the natural rights justification for 
intellectual property that Professor Goldstein found in the 
“practical intuition and economic analysis” of American 
intellectual history and the more cautious acceptance of 
limited protection for intellectual property balanced with 
other interests as claimed by Professor Netanel in the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects the heart of the 
argument of this Article.  The influence of the “property 
rights” theory has risen and begun to displace the “traditional 
incentives” theory in so far as judicial copyright doctrine on 
the first sale privilege is concerned. 
Armed with a natural rights foundation for intellectual 
property, the adherents of the proprietary model that invests 
(near) absolute control in the copyright holder would re-write 
Article I, Section 8, clause 8, of the Constitution to state: 
To reward the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for unlimited Times to authors (read: investors 
in the creative product of authors) [and inventors] the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings [and 
Discoveries]. 
Of course that would require a constitutional 
amendment, or would it? 
Even assuming the “traditional incentives” model has 
some vibrancy in the courts, most commentators agree that 
defining and calibrating the optimal incentives mechanism 
remains elusive, and in fact severely limits the usefulness of 
 45. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (enacted H.R. 2281) (1998).  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919 (The music 
industry brought numerous lawsuits in the 2000’s against individuals for 
private copying of music.). 
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the utilitarian theory.46 
Courts, however, do not have the luxury of waiting for 
proven theory and must make decisions which arguably are 
motivated by underlying assumptions about the effect and 
impact of their decisions on real actors in society, the 
copyright holders (authors or their investors), business 
interests not aligned with copyright holders, and the 
consuming public itself. Yet, coherent but divergent outcomes 
for similar fact patterns will occur because of the lack of 
consensus on the appropriate theory for copyright 
justification. 
For example, assume that a music producer seeks to limit 
the ability of a consumer to transfer a copy of a CD to a third 
party (the CD copy is authentic and rightfully in the 
possession of the consumer).  The same music producer sues 
different consumers on similar fact patterns in different 
courts.  In each case the CD had been packaged with a 
“license agreement” that contained language consistent with 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernor v. Autodesk.  One district 
court, whose reasoning follows the “property rights” paradigm 
that “maximal control” by the asset owner is justified by the 
underlying economic theory—and natural rights philosophy 
associated with that view—finds in favor of the music 
producer; holding that the CD may only remain in the 
indefinite possession of the original purchaser.  This strand of 
utilitarian theory, namely the Demsetz economic model, does 
not associate too much protection with monopoly 
inefficiencies.  Professor Goldstein’s depiction of the 
“copyright optimists” and Judge Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion 
illustrate the paradigm’s central tenet that more protection is 
directly related to more societal welfare and the market 
 46. Peter Menell wrote “recent work has shown that the holy grail of a 
perfectly calibrated incentive system is unattainable.”  Menell, supra note 20, at 
163.  William Fisher wrote that the practical necessity of integrating the 
various incentive theories to produce a workable framework remained elusive. 
Fisher, supra note 21, at 21.  He concluded that, “[u]ntil that challenge is 
successfully met, the power of the utilitarian approach to provide guidance to 
lawmakers will be sharply limited.”  Id.  I would note that Fisher’s use of term 
“utilitarian approach” is associated with that strand of utilitarian theory 
supporting the “traditional incentives” model where protection is “balanced” 
against access by users of creative works in order to optimize societal welfare.  
The other strand of utilitarian theory that supports the Demsetz model argues 
that societal welfare is optimized by maximizing protection and thus no 
balancing is required. 
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implicitly minimizes the existence of negative externalities. 
In the opposite case, an outcome finding against the 
music producer has justificatory force for a court whose 
rationale followed the theory that there is a point where over-
protection leads to monopoly inefficiencies.  Similarly if 
societal welfare is defined more broadly than wealth 
maximization, then an outcome which valued access to 
creative works for purposes of fair use and secondary markets 
for their independent contribution to societal welfare would 
have even greater justificatory force. 
The “traditional incentives” scholarship referred to the 
protection-access paradigm where on the one end too much 
protection created inefficiencies and on the other end too 
much access dis-incentivized creative production.  For 
purposes of this Article, the focus is on the pendulum 
swinging between a model of (near) absolute control by the 
copyright holder, which I have termed a “property rights” 
theory or paradigm of copyright, and something less than 
absolute control, which I have adopted the term “traditional 
incentives” theory or model of copyright, where limits on the 
copyright holder’s ability to control the distribution of its 
work are acknowledged and supported. 
B. Context 
Before turning to the main argument of the Article 
contained in Parts II and III, it is helpful to set the stage by 
examining a myriad of topics all related to judicial and 
legislative treatment of software.  First, CONTU, the 
commission established by Congress to consider the 
appropriate treatment of computer programs (software), is 
discussed as well as the statute that was produced by that 
process, § 117, the essential copying doctrine.47  Next, the 
Article discusses the legislative histories of § 117 and § 109, 
the first sale doctrine, because the commentators and courts 
have relied on constructions of § 117 to inform § 109 
decisions.48  Vernor II relied on its prior construction of § 117 
for its rationale and outcome of its decision concerning § 109’s 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1998); CONTU stands for Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works. 
 48. See infra notes 59–72, 223–26, and accompanying text. 
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first sale doctrine.49  Also, the court’s construction of § 117 
has been infused with strong “property rights” theory spilling 
over to § 109’s construction as well. 
Next, the Article examines several judicial decisions of 
the circuit courts in the 1990’s and early 2000’s that involved 
software licensing for the role they played in later decisions, 
especially those relevant to the main discussion of this 
Article.  A central tenet of this Article, namely that the 
contemporary pro-software decisions suffered from an 
analytical error of confusing contract for copyright analysis, 
can be traced to the analytical approach of these early 
decisions of ProCD v. Zeidenberg50 and Bowers v. Baystate.51  
These decisions also represented the displacement of the 
“traditional incentives” theory by rise of the “property rights” 
theory of justification for the special protection afforded 
copyright holders.  Since the decisions couched their opinions 
in contract reasoning, the jurisprudential copyright theory at 
work in the rationale of the courts was not detected.  This 
confusion infected the later first sale software decisions as 
well as the commentary on these decisions that continued to 
be distracted by the contract critique.  Finally, the Article 
discusses the attempted passage of Article 2B to the UCC, 
which was meant to resolve some questions related to 
software licensing, because of its heated debate and 
particular effect on the commentary during the 1990’s 
surrounding treatment of software transactions. 
1. CONTU and Status of Software 
In 1983, the Third Circuit found software to be 
copyrightable subject matter.52  Also, Congress had 
commissioned a group named CONTU to study and 
recommend legislation for the treatment of computer 
programs (referred to herein as software) in the intellectual 
property legal regime.53  Based on their recommendations, 
 49. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 50. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) 
 51. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 52. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 
1253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 53. See Richard H. Stern, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of the 
Software Users’ Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459, 460 
(1985). 
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Congress passed § 117 of the Computer Software Copyright 
Act in 1980.54  Section 117 known as the “essential copying” 
doctrine was designed to provide a safe harbor for software 
users from triggering the right of reproduction in the normal 
operation of their software.55  By the late 1980’s there was 
significant criticism by scholars of the construction of § 117 by 
the courts, which were finding that many software users did 
not qualify for the benefits of the statute.56 
Ironically the stated purpose of § 117 had been to solve 
the problem of the pre-digital Copyright Act, namely that 
“use” of the computer program involved the exclusive right to 
reproduce.57  Think of the pre-digital example of a book.  To 
read a book, or make normal use of it, did not invoke the 
copyright holder’s exclusive right of reproduction.  Reading a 
digital book on a computer (or other digital device) does 
invoke that right as the computer (or other electronic device) 
automatically makes copies of digital content in the 
processing of the data.  Without a license from the copyright 
holder or some other exemption, the user is committing 
copyright infringement which can carry serious penalties.58  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 461–66. 
 56. Id. at 483–85.  Stern’s reference to the phrase, “illusory promise” in his 
title, was the effect, he argued, for software users because of the court’s narrow 
construction of § 117.  Id.  Stern wrote that Congress’ act to replace “rightful 
possessor” with “owner,” amounted to a “modification [that] left the door open to 
extensive sleight of hand in the name of bailments, leases, licenses and other 
putatively non-sale transactions.”  Id. at 467 (emphasis in original); see also 
Pamela Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright 
Doctrine to Accommodate a New Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 191–92, 
221 (1988) (Samuelson criticized CONTU as well as Congress for failure to 
satisfactorily ensure software users the ability to make essential copies and 
adaptations.  Samuelson argued for a private person use exemption as an 
extension of the fair use holding of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
 57. See Robert A. Kreis, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 BYU L. REV. 
1497, 1522 (1991); Stern, supra note 53, at 463. 
 58. See Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 
1070 (2010).  Professor Perzanowski discussed the “RAM Copy Doctrine” 
established by the Ninth Circuit in its decision, MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).  Perzanowski noted that the Ninth 
Circuit sided with the copyright holders and the decision over time came to 
stand for “the notion that all RAM instantiations, however fleeting, are copies.” 
Cf. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2nd Cir. 
2008).  In this more recent decision by the Second Circuit, Perzanowski noted 
that “[a]lthough Peak continues to represent the dominant approach, the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings suggests that courts 
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Nevertheless, the courts have been comfortable, in fact 
motivated to agree with the software producer’s 
characterization of ownership thereby depriving most 
software users (i.e. licensees are not owners) of the benefit of 
§ 117’s safe harbor from copyright infringement. 
2. Legislative History of §§ 109 and 117 
The legislative history of §§ 109 and 117 does not lend 
great support for a broad or synthetic view of ownership 
favored by the critics of the pro-software producer decisions.59  
The statutory language of both § 109 and § 117 uses the term 
“owner” when referring to the possessor of a copy.60  CONTU 
had recommended that § 117 apply to all “rightful 
possessors.”61  Without explanation Congress substituted the 
term “owner” for “rightful possessor.”62  Despite inquiry to the 
Copyright Office, no explanation has been provided for this 
remain willing to consider claims of infringement based on temporary 
instantiations with sensitivity to the unique facts of particular cases.”  See 
Perzanowski, at 1080.  On November 10, 2011, the RIAA sent a cease and desist 
letter to ReDigi, Inc. claiming that its business of assisting legitimate owners of 
digital music to resell copies of their music constituted copyright infringement.  
Matthew Laser, RIAA wants ReDigi out of the business of selling “used” 
 iTunes tracks, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 15, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/11/riaa-wants-redigi-out-of-the-business-of-selling-used-itunes 
-tracks.ars (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).  ReDigi ensures that the original copy of 
music is deleted but in the process of transferring the copy a second copy of the 
digital song is created.  As the RIAA pointed out there is no digital first sale 
right.  Id.  If this were found to be willful infringement penalties can be as high 
as $150,000 per work infringed (as the RIAA points out).  Id.  There is no 
decision on whether this practice would be considered fair use.  Id. 
 59. See Kreis, supra note 57, at 1516, 1536–37, 1539 (Kreis claimed that 
Congress had made a conscious decision to not follow the recommendations of 
CONTU and use the term “rightful possessor.”  Id. at 1537.  He also claimed 
that Congress knew how to use that term because in the 1990 amendment to 
Section 109 (b) (1) to prohibit rentals of computer software programs, Congress 
used both terms “owner” and “possessor.”  Id. at 1536.  The broader category of 
a person in “possession” of a copy of a computer program was used to define 
those parties who did not have right under first sale doctrine to rent their 
copies.  In contrast, the text of Section 109 (a) containing the first sale doctrine 
itself contains the narrow term “owner.”  Id.  Kreiss argued, however, that 
“rightful possessors” of computer programs without benefit of formal title have 
the right to make essential copies and archival copies of the program in the 
normal operation of the computer running the programs through contract 
theory of implied license.  Id. at 1539.  That view still would not give software 
users the right to sell or otherwise alienate the copy of software.). 
 60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (1998). 
 61. Stern, supra note 53, at 460 n.8; Samuelson, supra note 56, at 188. 
 62. Samuelson, supra note 56, at 188. 
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change and the legislative history is silent.63  MAI v. Peak64 
was the first circuit court decision to interpret the term 
“owner” in the context of § 117.  As discussed infra, the Ninth 
Circuit offered little rationale or reasoning but found that the 
magic words of “license” controlling, with the effect that the 
software users did not have the benefit of § 117.65 
As commentators have noted, Congress’ affirmative act to 
replace “rightful possessor” with “owner” in § 117 weighs 
against the argument that “possession” is enough based on 
traditional statutory construction.66  If not in 1980, certainly 
in 1998 when § 117 was amended, Congress would have 
known that the standard license agreement governing 
distribution of software contained language stating that the 
user is a licensee not an owner of a copy of software. The 
effect of using the term “owner” not “rightful possessor” in the 
statutory language was to give software publishers greater 
control over the distribution of their software.67 
Commentators have argued that Congress appeared to 
intend the narrower construction in § 109 as well.  In an 
article written by Stephen Kyle Tapp and Daniel E. Wanat in 
1991, they noted that Congress had an opportunity in 1984 
and 1990 when amending § 109 to amend subsection (d) 
which limits the application of § 109, or the first sale doctrine, 
to those in possession of a copy but have not acquired 
ownership of it.68  Tapp and Wanat noted that if the amended 
§ 117 was to be read in harmony with § 109 (a) and (d) an 
owner of a copy only, and not a possessor, would be granted 
the privileges embodied within both sections.69 
The upshot has been a very narrow construction of the 
essential copying doctrine such that if the copyright holder 
(e.g., software producer) unilaterally claims that its 
 63. See Stern, supra note 53, at 460. 
 64. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 519 n.5 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
 65. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Stern, supra note 53, at 467 (The implication is that Congress made 
an affirmative choice to narrow the scope of the intended beneficiary of the 
statute from the broader category of possessor despite the recommendation of 
CONTU). 
 67. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 188–89. 
 68. See Stephen Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer Software 
Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair Use, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 197 (1992). 
 69. See id. at 214–15, 215 n.67. 
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users/licensees are not owners the court has upheld that 
characterization.70  To make matters worse, courts have been 
inclined to inject a narrow, “property rights” driven 
construction of § 117 into their reasoning for § 109 first sale 
doctrine decisions involving software.  As will be discussed 
infra, the Ninth Circuit in Vernor v. Autodesk (Vernor II) 
found no difficulty relying on its prior construction of § 117 to 
resolve a § 109 case.71  The Ninth Circuit added a few bells 
and whistles, constructing a multi-factor test that was 
substantively equivalent to their prior § 117 rationale.72 
The problem with this approach is that it fails to examine 
the different underlying purposes of §§ 109 and 117.  Section 
117 came into being as a narrow statutory doctrine with the 
purpose of conforming the practical realities of software use 
to traditional copyright principles.  Even if arguably that 
purpose has been thwarted by the software industry’s 
licensing practices and courts recognition of such, the history 
and purpose of § 109 is much larger.  It was born of common 
law doctrine, and then codified into statute.  Over a century 
old, it has traditionally been associated with serving one of 
the primary interests of copyright, namely the availability 
and accessibility of creative works to society.  I argue that 
courts should exercise greater scrutiny to distinguish these 
legislative acts and give greater deference to a vibrant, robust 
first sale doctrine.  This would further the venerable purpose 
of the doctrine and the broader interests of copyright. 
3. Judicial Decisions Concerning Software 
Turning to the significant decisions of the period related 
to software, there were the circuit court decisions of Step-
Saver v. Wyse Tech73 in the Third Circuit, ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg74 in the Seventh Circuit, and Bowers v. Baystate75 
in the Federal Circuit. 
In 1991, in Step-Saver, the Third Circuit addressed the 
question of whether an end user license agreement (“EULA”) 
 70. Id. at 239. 
 71. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1114–15 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
 72. Id. at 1110–11. 
 73. Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 74. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 75. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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that disclaimed UCC warranties was enforceable against a 
buyer of software who alleged that he had not assented to 
those terms.76  The Third Circuit applied the UCC but found 
that the EULA attached to the product constituted an 
additional term after purchase of the product and had been 
rejected by the buyer.77  The court held for the buyer.  In 
response to the software producer claiming this decision 
would have dire consequences for the industry, Judge 
Wisdom, author of the Step-Saver opinion, included a lengthy 
(and often quoted) footnote on his view of software licensing 
practices.  Judge Wisdom noted that software producers 
started their licensing practices in the 1980’s in an effort to 
avoid first sale doctrine because they feared the rental and 
copying of their software.78  With the 1990 amendment to § 
109 prohibiting rental of computer programs, Judge Wisdom 
believed that it was no longer necessary for software 
producers to structure their transaction as a license rather 
than a sale, referring to the “fiction” of the license.79 
Following this decision, Judge Easterbrook authored the 
ProCD opinion in 1996 for the Seventh Circuit, and found a 
EULA enforceable where the user/licensee was restricted 
from using the software for commercial purposes.80  
Construing the UCC and relying on contract principles, the 
Seventh Circuit distinguished Step-Saver, declaring UCC 
section 2-207 irrelevant to the case, and relying on a 
construction of UCC section 2-204 and UCC section 2-606.81  
ProCD also found no preemption of copyright law, noting that 
generally private contracts are not affected by preemption.82  
Language in the opinion waxed prolifically about the 
importance of private ordering to the optimal functioning of 
the markets and society, evidencing a “property rights” theory 
 76. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 93. 
 77. Id. at 105–06.  The Third Circuit relied on its construction of UCC § 2-
207—often referred to as the “battle of the forms” provision.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 96 n.7. 
 79. See id. 
 80. ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).  The rationale 
of ProCD reflects the influence of the utilitarian branch of “property rights” 
paradigm inspired by Demsetz economic theory.  It supports maximal control of 
copyrighted works and believes that price discrimination will lead to optimal 
allocation of creative works.  First sale poses leakage to the model and is 
disfavored. 
 81. See id. 1452–53. 
 82. Id. at 1453–54. 
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of copyright.83 
The Seventh Circuit was sensitive to the fact that it 
relied on contract reasoning rather than copyright analysis. 
As if anticipating the criticism that followed, the opinion 
expressed the limited scope of its (intended) effect by noting: 
A copyright is a right against the world.  Contracts, by 
contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may 
do as they please, so contracts do not create “exclusive 
rights.”  Someone who found a copy of SelectPhone 
(trademark) on the street would not be affected by the 
shrinkwrap license—though the federal copyright laws of 
their own force would limit the finder’s ability to copy or 
transmit the application program.84 
Lacking the benefit of prophetic foresight, the Seventh 
Circuit had no idea that less than a decade later the Ninth 
Circuit would essentially find that someone picking up a copy 
of a software on the street could be obligated to comply with 
similar restrictions as those of ProCD.85  The flaw in ProCD’s 
reasoning was finding privity, upon which a contract analysis 
depends.  More striking was that this defect didn’t prevent a 
sweeping statement that copyright is a right against the 
world, but contract is limited to its parties.  Belief in the 
exclusive role of markets, an integral part of the “property 
rights” theory of intellectual property, helps to explain this 
irrational exuberance. 
In 2002, the Federal Circuit, in Bowers, addressed the 
question of whether a shrink wrap license (EULA) could 
contract away the fair use right of reverse engineering 
software established by judicial doctrine.86  In that case, 
Baystate (accused of copyright infringement by reverse 
 83. Id. at 1454–55.  ProCD was influenced by the Supreme Court decision, 
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), which found that the forum 
selection clause on the back of a pre-printed ticket sent to the buyer after 
payment had been made was enforceable.  Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 596.  
ProCD analogized generally to the custom in the travel, entertainment and 
insurance industries where money now, terms later is normal course of 
business.  ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454–55.  Of course those service businesses do not 
have the benefit of a federally created right in copyright granting them special 
protection in the marketplace. 
 84. See id. at 1454. 
 85. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1102 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 86. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1317, 1323–24 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 22 Side A      04/16/2012   17:10:32
SHERIDAN FINAL 3/29/2012  2:22:16 PM 
2012] RISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY 321 
engineering Bower’s software) obtained copies of the software 
product according to the opinion.87  What did that mean?  He 
picked up a copy at his local retail store?  As the dissent 
correctly pointed out there was not a negotiated contract and 
it was a stretch of the imagination to pretend there was 
“mutual assent” to the “waiver” of the judicial doctrine 
establishing a fair use right to reverse engineer software to 
obtain access to non-protectable ideas buried in the source 
code of the program.88 
Bowers’ majority argued that they were following ProCD 
and famously quoted from the opinion about the difference 
between copyright and contract.89  What difference is there, 
as the dissent pointed out, if a simple EULA (read: notice) is 
slapped on every retail package distributed around the 
world?90 
The mere presence of a shrink wrap license agreement 
does not prove mutual assent as the Federal Circuit claimed 
in Bowers.91  More importantly it does not prove privity, a 
bedrock principle of contract theory for assigning rights and 
duties.  That is the fallacy of logic that began with ProCD, 
continued through Bowers, then leaped further into 
imaginary space in the pro-software first sale decisions. As 
the district judge pointed out in ProCD the software user 
 87. Id. at 1322. 
 88. Id. at 1336–37 (Prior circuit doctrine had established that reverse 
engineering source code to obtain access to unprotected elements of the code 
may be protectable activity under the fair use doctrine as it supports innovation 
through the promotion of interoperability of products.) 
 89. Id. at 1325. 
 90. Id. at 1336–37 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 157 (2005)).  Judge Dyk wrote in his dissent that the majority’s 
ruling was akin to a “black dot” state law that could not be upheld.  Id.  He 
argued that: 
[a] state is not free to eliminate the fair use defense.  Enforcement of a 
total ban on reverse engineering would conflict with the Copyright Act 
itself by protecting otherwise unprotectable [sic] material.  If state law 
provided that a copyright holder could bar fair use of the copyrighted 
material by placing a black dot on each copy of the work offered for 
sale, there would be no question but that the state law would be 
preempted.  A state law that allowed a copyright holder to simply label 
its products so as to eliminate a fair use defense would ‘substantially 
impede’ the public's right to fair use and allow the copyright holder, 
through state law, to protect material that the Congress has 
determined must be free to all under the Copyright Act. 
 Id. 
 91. See id. at 1323–24. 
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never assented to the shrink wrap agreement that purported 
to restrict his use of the software to non-commercial uses.92  
Zeidenberg purchased the software at a local retail store, 
according to the opinion, not directly from ProCD, the 
software retailer.93  Where is the privity between ProCD and 
Zeidenberg?  Both ProCD and earlier court in Step-Saver 
applied UCC provisions to the outcome of their decisions.94  
The courts have implicitly (without express UCC provisions) 
attached “restrictions” (rather than benefits) that affect 
downstream parties (i.e. end users) who legitimately 
purchase the software product.95 
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s famous claim that its 
decision grounded in contract was not a claim against the 
world, the effect of its reasoning, conflating contract analysis 
with copyright analysis, was to lay the groundwork and basis 
for just that—a contract, called a EULA, operating as a right 
against the world, against every anonymous retailer, and 
consumer purchasing a software product with a EULA (read: 
notice) affixed to it.96 
The fatal flaw inherent in this analysis is the fiction of 
“mutual assent” and “implied privity” as cover for a multitude 
of sins.  Instead of transparently arguing for unlimited, 
unfettered property right of the copyright holder justified in 
copyright, the courts found copyright infringement, favoring 
content producer (namely software producers in these 
decisions) but relied on a contract analysis.  The fiction of the 
 92. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
 93. Id. at 645. 
 94. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447; Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 
F.2d 91, 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 95. There seems to be a reverse logic in how courts have considered the 
UCC in the context of software transactions.  Traditionally manufacturers 
avoided exposure to consumers of UCC warranties by asserting a lack of vertical 
privity with the consumers.  UCC 2-318 modified the common law rule that a 
seller’s warranties only apply to the party in privity.  This provision attaches 
the warranties to downstream parties that have contact with the product.  
Depending on the alternative rule adopted by the state, the immediate 
family/household may be the beneficiary of the warranty or more broadly any 
person who could reasonably be expected to “use, consume or be affected” by the 
goods. 
 96. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of 
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 148 (1999) [hereinafter 
Beyond Preemption] (Lemley argued that the passage of UCC2B would “usher 
in an era of ‘private legislation.’ ” ).  Notwithstanding the (general) failure of 
adoption of UCC2B, I argue that judicial doctrine is accomplishing that goal. 
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license that Step-Saver referred to is really the fiction of 
“mutual assent” as cover for a copyright theory of unlimited 
property rights invested in the content producer. 
4. UCC 2B 
This section briefly reviews the controversy over the 
passage of UCC2B as another influential factor in the debate 
over the contemporary software decisions.  During the 1990’s 
the heated debate and controversy over the passage of a 
separate article to the UCC to govern transactions involving 
computer software, entitled UCC2B, framed the debate as one 
focused on contract theory and nominally questions of 
preemption.97  UCC2B proposed a separate section to the 
UCC for the establishment of default rules for the treatment 
of contracts involving computer information, i.e., software.  
These proposed rules included terms about warranties and 
self-help remedies that a software producer could avail itself 
of in event of a defaulting customer.  The criticism of UCC2B 
was that it would contract away rights that software users 
would otherwise enjoy under existing statute or judicial 
doctrine, including the right to transfer a copy of their 
software, or the right to reverse engineer the software to 
obtain the underlying “ideas” not protected by copyright.98  
UCC2B was generally perceived as pro-software industry and 
criticized by a diverse group of parties including the 
American Library Association, the FTC, several state AG’s 
and many scholars, to name a few.99  Although it eventually 
 97. See id. at 118–26, 136–46. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Dorte Toft, Opponents Blast Proposed Software Law, CNN.COM, Jul. 
12, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9907/12/ucita.idg/index.html.  
UCC2B was originally a project of the ALI and NCCUSL to draft and support 
state by state adoption of a new article to the UCC to address specifically 
information technology transactions including software.  UCITA 101 & 102, 
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/ 
copyright/ucita/ucita101.cfm (last visited Nov. 28, 2011); There was a great deal 
of controversy and criticism of initial drafts by consumer groups including 
Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce (“AFFECT”), American Library 
Association, State AG’s, IT professional organizations, even the FTC and many 
scholars.  Id.; UCITA: Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 
JAMESSHUGGINS.COM, http://www.jamesshuggins.com/h/tek1/ucita.htm (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2011).  In April 1999, ALI withdrew.  NCCUSL continued its 
efforts, renaming the article UCITA (stand-alone legislation) and hoped to gain 
state-by-state passage.  By 2000 they had two states adopt the law, Virginia and 
Maryland.  UCITA Online: The Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
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failed as a legislative process, many of the stated fears of the 
critics, notably that software producers would: (a) gain rights 
to disclaim warranties through a EULA, (b) prevent reverse 
engineering through a EULA, or (c) prevent transfer of a copy 
of software through a EULA, have come true as part of the 
judicial doctrine.100 
At the dawn of the new millennium, there was a lack of 
clarity in the law related to questions of software licensing.  
Trends favoring the interests of software industry from the 
prior decade included the Ninth Circuit’s assertion in MAI v. 
Peak that for purposes of § 117 a software licensee is not an 
owner of a copy of software, and the Seventh Circuit’s holding 
in ProCD v. Zeidenberg that parties can “contract around” 
copyright doctrine via a EULA, and that is good for society 
because it furthers the practice of price discrimination. 
Courts following the “property rights” theory of copyright 
would be expected to sympathize with software industry’s 
efforts to establish default rules in UCC2B, and arguably 
inclined to develop judicial doctrine that reached the same 
results. 
During the period of 2000 to 2003, two district courts 
sitting in the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether 
a EULA could defeat the first sale doctrine when the party 
asserting the first sale defense was a third party reseller 
clearly not in privity with the software producer.  All three 
decisions involved the same software producer, Adobe, and 
very similar fact patterns.  The two district courts arrived at 
Act (UCITA) is a Proposed State Contract Law, UCITAONLINE.COM, 
http://www.ucitaonline.com (last visited Dec. 13, 2011); Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_ 
Computer_Information_Transactions_Act (last visited Dec. 13, 2011),   
However, four states, Iowa, Vermont, North Carolina, and West Virginia, 
adopted “bomb-shelter” laws providing that their citizens were specifically 
shielded from the effects of the law.  See Alorie Gilbert, Supporters Back Away 
From Software Bill, CNET News (Aug. 7, 2003), http://news.cnet.com/2100-
1028-5061061.html. 
 100. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1102 (9th Cir. 
2010).  The Ninth Circuit found that EULA prevented anyone who possessed a 
copy of the software from exercising first sale rights to transfer a copy of the 
software without permission of the software producer.  Id.  See Bowers v. 
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The Federal Circuit 
found that the EULA effectively prevented user from reverse engineering to 
discover the unprotected elements of the software code, despite prior judicial 
doctrine holding that that activity was deemed fair use.  Id. 
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divergent outcomes with the Northern District favoring the 
software producer, and the Central District favoring the 
reseller defendant.  The following section analyzes these 
decisions and demonstrates how the courts’ express rationale 
followed contract reasoning where the more coherent 
justification for the divergent decisions lies in their adherence 
to the competing copyright theories of “property rights” and 
“traditional incentives.” 
5.  Dueling Decisions on Software Licensing and First 
Sale Doctrine 
A great deal has changed in the economy and society 
since 1908 when the Supreme Court fashioned the first sale 
doctrine in its decision Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.  For the 
consumer, the first sale doctrine has been clear in the hard 
copy world of distribution of books, music and film.  Even if 
the consumer did not recognize the doctrine by name they 
were familiar with the concept.  The expectation that a book 
purchased from a bookstore could later be given to a friend, 
donated to the library or sold at a used bookstore would be a 
familiar one. 
The digital age has transformed how society accesses and 
uses copyrighted works.  In the 21st century, consumers have 
become accustomed to purchasing software for their PC’s for 
various purposes from utility, word processing and 
accounting, to entertainment and games.  Most consumers 
have some vague idea that these products come with more 
restrictions than their hard copy book purchased at the 
bookstore (or online from vendor such as Amazon), but they 
probably do not know the specific contours of these 
restrictions.  They probably do not read the terms of the 
EULA that the software producer included with the software 
product.  It has become customary for software producers to 
include a EULA that restricts transferability of the software 
product and thus either totally or partially obstructs (or 
arguably attempts to) the applicability of copyright law’s first 
sale doctrine to the software product. 
As discussed supra, ProCD found these EULAs 
enforceable and their restrictions on the type of use of the 
software binding on the purchaser of the software product.101  
 101. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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In the trio of Adobe decisions discussed below, the ProCD 
opinion is pushed to another level; it is not the user but a 
reseller who has been sued for copyright infringement by the 
software producer for attempting to ignore the license 
restrictions contained in the EULA.  Despite ProCD’s 
declaration that if someone picked up the software on the 
street the license restriction would not be binding upon them, 
the software producer, Adobe, argued that its restrictions 
were binding even on someone who picked up the software on 
the street, so to speak.102 
At the dawn of the new millennium, three actions for 
copyright infringement with very similar fact patterns were 
decided with split decisions between two district courts.  In 
the initial decision, One Stop Micro v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,103 
the district court of the Northern District of California found 
in favor of the software producer holding that the first sale 
doctrine did not apply.  One year later in Softman Products 
Co., LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,104 the district court of the 
Central District of California arrived at the opposite result, 
finding against Adobe on grounds that first sale doctrine did 
apply.  Finally, in the following year, 2002, in Adobe Systems, 
Inc. v. Stargate,105 its second decision involving Adobe and a 
third reseller, the district court of the Northern District of 
California again found that first sale doctrine did not apply. 
As they both sit in the Ninth Circuit they could not help but 
notice and respond to the other’s decision. 
 
 102. Id.  The difference between ProCD’s fact situation on the one hand and 
One Stop and Stargate on the other is that in the former the user/licensee was 
the initial purchaser of the software.  I critique the privity analysis of ProCD; 
however, I also argue that even ProCD’s purported limited scope was violated in 
the One Stop and Stargate decisions.  ProCD argued that the initial purchaser 
had privity but that someone else who happened to obtain copies of the software 
could not be held to the restrictions contained in the EULA.  Id. at 1454.  One 
Stop and Stargate had fact patterns where the resellers had obtained the copies 
of software from third parties rather than directly from the software producer, 
or the software producer’s distributor or retailer.  See infra notes 103–05 and 
accompanying text.  Nevertheless the restrictions including similar use 
restrictions as ProCD were found enforceable as a copyright action. 
 103. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
 104. SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 
2001). 
 105. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
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In every case, Adobe sued the reseller for copyright 
infringement based on violations of its licensing agreements.  
These were authentic copies but Adobe argued that its license 
agreements conditioned its exclusive right of distribution 
such that any violation of these restrictions constituted 
copyright infringement.  In each case, the reseller argued that 
its distribution was protected by the first sale doctrine.  In 
some instances, it was a restriction specifying that 
distribution was limited to only educational users, and in 
others it was a bundling restriction, i.e., the software disks 
could not be unbundled and sold separately.106 Adobe argued 
that it licensed rather than sold all copies of its software so 
the first sale doctrine did not apply.107  Since it had licensed 
certain software with restrictions and the resellers in 
question violated the terms of the license, Adobe argued that 
these resellers were infringing its copyright.108 
On very similar fact patterns, the two district courts 
reached diametrically different outcomes.  In all three cases, 
there was a) no privity between the software producer and 
the three different software resellers, b) a cause of action 
brought by software producer in copyright, and c) the 
situation where the software producer attempted to enforce 
license restrictions similar to ProCD.  All three courts avoided 
developing a strong rationale based on copyright theory, and 
their contract approach was foundationally weak for the lack 
of privity and mutual assent, bedrock principles of contract 
theory. 
Next, this Article turns to the commentary on these first 
sale decisions involving software.  The distraction of the 
contract critique led to a failure to scrutinize the heritage of 
these decisions and to recognize the shift in the theoretical 
justification of copyright underlying the pro-software 
decisions. 
 
 106. See One Stop, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1088; SoftMan, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; 
Stargate, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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6. Academic Commentary on First Sale Software 
Decisions 
Scholars have been unpersuasive in their arguments that 
a “rightful possessor” of a copyrighted work should benefit 
from the same privileges under copyright as an “owner.”  As 
described supra, the courts have largely followed the opposite 
course, borrowing the very narrow statutory construction of 
“owner” from § 117 decisions, and adopting the software 
producer’s characterization of the transaction as a “license” 
not a “sale” as expressed in the software industry’s standard 
EULA.  The commentary’s critical analysis of the pro-
software first sale decisions has failed to emphasize the 
flawed contract reasoning employed by the courts in the 
express reasoning of their decisions, or to draw attention to 
the underlying copyright rationale at work in these decisions. 
This section examines two articles focused directly on 
software licensing and first sale doctrine, which include the 
2004 article by John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking 
First Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful,109 and the 
recent article by Brian Carver, Why License Agreements Do 
Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential 
Copies.110  Both articles critique the current trend by courts to 
uphold the software industry’s position that the license 
transaction is a license not a sale, and first sale is not 
triggered.  They rely on arguments based on the UCC, 
general commercial law, and analogous patent decisions, 
rather than the heritage and theoretical foundation of the 
pro-software first sale decisions. 
The Incredible Shrinking First Sale Rule argued that 
software publishers employed a strategy of preventing users 
of software from gaining ownership rights through their 
distribution strategy of restrictive license agreements.111  The 
article went on to argue that this strategy failed because the 
UCC would not recognize these restrictions on title.112  
Unfortunately the article provided no authority supporting 
this specific point that the UCC prevents software publishers 
 109. John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are 
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 110. Carver, supra note 12. 
 111. See Rothchild, supra note 109, at 37. 
 112. Id. at 39. 
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from restricting the transfer of title in copies of their 
copyrighted works. 
The only judicial support for the statement that 
restrictions on title would not be recognized was a 1907 Sixth 
Circuit decision involving patent law and price 
discrimination.  In John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman,113 
an opinion by Judge, later Supreme Court Justice, Lurton, 
involved a drug manufacturer that based on its proprietary 
formula attempted to exercise price control over the 
distribution of its products.114  The attempt to enforce the 
price restrictions was struck down.115  It was a leap to go from 
a patent license attempting price control to a copyright 
license retaining rights of ownership and restricting manner 
(not price) of distribution of the copyrighted material.  
Neither the legal theory nor the facts underlying Hartman 
supported a convincing rationale for its connection to or 
critique of the contemporary pro-software decisions.  
Nevertheless, after citing Hartman, the article continued its 
argument by stating: 
Thus, if a software publisher sells software copies to a 
distributor, who is bound contractually to distribute the 
copies only to specified users or under specified 
circumstances, but who faithlessly distributes the copies 
in violation of the contract, the transaction nonetheless 
transfers good title to the acquirer.116 
This statement was supported by a footnote with two 
lengthy paragraphs.  The first paragraph began, Courts that 
have failed to appreciate this point, then went on to list 
several decisions including the decisions of One Stop and 
Stargate.117  The next paragraph stated, “courts that have 
applied the principle correctly” and cited the decision of 
Softman.118  There were no circuit court decisions involving 
copyright and first sale supporting the statement.  In another 
footnote, the article conceded that “the majority of courts 
conclude that copies of software are licensed, not sold.”119  In 
 113. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). 
 114. See Rothchild, supra note 109, at 41–42. 
 115. Id. at 42. 
 116. Id. at 42–43. 
 117. Id. at 42–43 n.151. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 27 n.84. 
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the following footnote, the article acknowledged that this was 
the view of the Copyright Office.120  The article seemed to 
offer more support for the opposite view it claimed to be 
taking.  
Next, the article attempted to analogize to commercial 
law arguing that such limitations may create a security 
interest, as an academic point.121  There was no judicial 
authority to support this claim.  As discussed infra the pro-
content producers’ decisions, beginning with Platt & Munk 
Co., Inc., v. Republic Graphics, Inc.122 and American 
International Pictures v. Foreman,123 view intellectual 
property as special, and not subject to same treatment as 
other tangible property.124  In American International 
Pictures, the Fifth Circuit expressly held that copyright 
holders could effectively restrict transfer of title in their 
copyrighted works through the use of license agreements.125  
In this 1978 decision, film producers successfully argued that 
the first sale doctrine did not apply to the resale of film 
prints.126  The Incredible Shrinking First Sale Rule: Are 
Software Resale Limits Lawful overlooked this decision.  
Until the underlying rationale for this view is examined and 
critiqued, it will be difficult to move beyond the current 
majority view of the courts. 
The article, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy 
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, made the 
argument that indefinite possession should be the dispositive 
factor determining ownership in a copy, and the courts have 
it wrong.127  In a section with the heading “Magic Words 
Cases,” the article argued that a line of decisions which held 
that a license agreement did control ownership were all in 
error.128  It included the line of Ninth Circuit § 117 decisions 
referred to as MAI Trio as the progenitor of this unfortunate 
 120. Id. at 28 n.85. 
 121. Id. at 39–40. 
 122. Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
 123. Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 124. See infra notes 142–72 and accompanying text. 
 125. Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc., 576 F.2d 661. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1925–29. 
 128. Id. at 1899–1901. 
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occurrence.129  The criticism of MAI echoed by earlier 
commentators was its lack of substantive analysis or 
rationale for its conclusion (contained in a footnote) that, 
“Since MAI (software producer) licensed its software, the 
Peak customers do not qualify as ‘owners’ of the software and 
are not eligible for protection under § 117.”130  As will be 
discussed infra, Vernor II did rely on MAI Trio for its finding 
in favor of the software producer.131 
The article cited the 1994 district court decision, 
Microsoft v. Harmony132 as another example of a decision 
failing to apply the correct reasoning.133  Neither the 
precedent cited by Harmony, nor the express reliance on 
copyright rather than contract analysis by the decision, is 
explored in this article. A focus on the flaws inherent in the 
contract analysis as well as an investigation of the copyright 
theory heritage of the pro-software decisions may have led to 
a more persuasive critique of those decisions. 
The article analogized to the patent exhaustion decisions 
where the Supreme Court found limits on the patent holder’s 
control of its distribution right: the recent Supreme Court 
decision, Quanta v. LG Electronics,134 decided in 2008, and 
the legacy decision of Motion Picture Patents v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co.,135 decided in 1917.136  These decisions involved 
anti-competitive behavior of a different nature than in Vernor 
II, and particularly in the case of Quanta, a fairly complex 
fact pattern.  Like Professor Samuelson wrote more than 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 1900. 
 131. See infra Part II.E. 
 132. Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 133. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1901.  Harmony was a software licensing 
and first sale decision.  Id.  Professor Carver’s main criticism of Harmony was it 
that it “furthered the unfortunate trend of short statements that fail to carefully 
distinguish between copyright and copies, [when it wrote,] ‘Entering a license 
agreement is not a ‘sale’ for purposes of the first sale doctrine.’ ”   Id.  In fact as 
discussed infra, Harmony, unlike the MAI Trio, did rely on earlier authority to 
support its application of copyright reasoning that found that the software 
producer had demonstrated a course of conduct to retain title in the copies of 
the work.  See infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.  These earlier 
influences on Harmony were not explored in this Article. 
 134. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
 135. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 
(1917). 
 136. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 195–96. 
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twenty years earlier in her article Modifying Copyrighted 
Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a 
New Technology,137 Professor Carver’s article cited the 
principles enunciated in Motion Picture Patents that criticized 
restraints on alienation as “obnoxious to the public 
interest.”138  Motion Picture Patents also contained the famous 
statement by the Supreme Court that “the primary purpose of 
our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the 
owners of the patents, but is ‘to promote progress of science 
and the useful arts,’ ”  referring to the balance of the monopoly 
and the public interest.139 The principles enunciated could 
have been developed further to support the argument for a 
shift in the judicial doctrine of copyright.140 
In contrast, this Article offers an explanatory analytical 
framework for the pro-software decisions. In so doing, it 
attempts to expose the underlying weaknesses of the 
decisions’ express reasoning based on flawed contract 
analysis and misplaced statutory construction. Rather than 
focusing on the contract debate ostensibly at work in the 
express reasoning of the decisions, this Article argues that 
the competing copyright theories at work more coherently 
explain the divergent outcomes of the decisions. 
Parts II and III argue that the unifying rationale for the 
divergent outcomes in the split decisions of One Stop and 
Stargate on the one hand, and Softman on the other lies in 
their underlying theoretical justification which yielded two 
different models and rationales for copyright holders’ rights.  
 137. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 196. 
 138. Id. at 196 n.81. 
 139. Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at 511. 
 140. In Motion Picture Patents, the patent holder had argued that its 
patented film projectors could only be used in conjunction with film prints 
supplied by it and any violation of this restriction constituted patent 
infringement.  Id. at 518.  The Supreme Court held that a patent holder could 
not extend the patent monopoly by mandating the use of non-patented supplies 
with the patented product.  Id.  In Quanta Computer, the Supreme Court ruled 
that patent exhaustion applied to the facts of the case and the patent holder 
could not prevail on its claim of patent infringement.  Quanta, 553 U.S. at 2122.  
Professor Carver’s statement, relying on Quanta, that “the Supreme Court has 
found all manner of contractual restrictions on the sale and use of a tangible 
thing embodying a copyrighted or patent invention invalid” is overbroad.  
Carver, supra note 12, at 1944.  Neither Quanta nor Motion Pictures (which the 
article discussed in the same section supporting the aforementioned statement) 
addressed copyright.  More importantly, Quanta specifically excluded a question 
arising out of contract.  Quanta, 553 U.S. at 2122 n.7. 
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As discussed in Part II, One Stop and Stargate are more 
justifiably explained by tracing their heritage to several 
earlier decisions involving not only software but also other 
content, film prints and children’s toys.  The “inherent rights” 
copyright doctrine implicit in these pre-digital decisions 
represents the “natural rights” branch in the “property 
rights” paradigm of copyright.  This copyright theory offers a 
more coherent rationale for these decisions than the weak 
foundational theory of contract. 
Part II begins with an analysis of Platt because of its 
articulation for the premise of “special” rights of intellectual 
property, a concept that American International Pictures 
applied to its first sale decision involving distribution of film 
prints.  American International Pictures, influenced by Platt, 
articulated the “inherent rights” doctrine of copyright 
ownership.  This copyright doctrine, consistent with the 
principles of the “property rights” justification for copyright 
law, was followed in the subsequent software first sale 
decisions of Microsoft v. Harmony and ISC-Bunker Ramo 
Corp. v. Altech, Inc.141  As discussed infra, the contemporary 
decisions, beginning with the district court level decisions of 
One Stop and Stargate, through to the recent Ninth Circuit 
decision, Vernor II committed the analytical error of 
confusing contract analysis for copyright analysis; however, 
all of these decisions can be rationalized with the “property 
rights” theory of copyright.  The decisions that found against 
the software producer and construed the first sale doctrine 
more broadly are best explained by adherence to the 
“traditional incentives” theory of copyright. 
Part III discusses Softman in the context of the 
progenitor first sale decision, Bobbs-Merrill, as well as a line 
of decisions finding for limitations on the copyright holder’s 
power to retain title.  These decisions support the “traditional 
incentives” model of drawing a limit on the power of the 
copyright holder in order to ensure the benefits of availability 
and accessibility of creative works to the society at large.  At 
the moment this is the minority view of the courts, and 
arguably overruled by precedent of Ninth Circuit in its recent 
decision, Vernor II.  Nevertheless, the theory and rationale of 
 141. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ill. 
1990). 
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the “traditional incentives” model forms the best fit with the 
progenitor first sale decision, Bobbs-Merrill, and fulfills those 
promises made over a century ago. 
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY AND THE PRO-COPYRIGHT HOLDER
DECISIONS
Before reaching the contemporary software decisions 
including Vernor II in the Ninth Circuit, this section traces 
the heritage of the Northern District of California’s first pro-
software producer/first sale decision of One Stop to an early 
pre-digital decision of the Fifth Circuit, American 
International Pictures (AIP II) that involved the distribution 
of film prints.  Going further back, AIP II cited the Second 
Circuit decision, Platt & Munk v. Republic Graphics, Inc. 
(Platt), authored by Judge Friendly.  Platt expressed support 
for the principle that a federally created right of copyright is 
treated differently when there is a clash or conflict with state 
derived rights.  Influenced by Platt, AIP II promulgated the 
doctrine of “inherent rights” of copyright ownership, which 
represents the natural rights branch of the “property rights” 
paradigm of copyright.  The software first sale decisions of 
Harmony and ISC-Bunker cited AIP II, and clearly followed 
its copyright rationale of the “inherent rights” doctrine (“AIP 
II Trio”).  One Stop represents the fragile link between AIP II 
Trio decisions, and the recent decision of the Ninth Circuit, 
Vernor v. Autodesk.  The analytical break from copyright to 
contract rationale was influenced by the factors discussed 
supra.  The most cogent explanation for the decisions of 
Vernor II and the earlier pro-software first sale decisions of 
One Stop and Stargate is the “property rights” paradigm of 
copyright. 
A. Special Nature of Copyright: One Stop and Back to Platt 
The court in One Stop began its copyright analysis of the 
first sale question by citing the current codification of the 
doctrine in section 109(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.142  Next, 
it stated that “[t]he first sale doctrine is only triggered by an 
actual sale.  Accordingly, a copyright owner does not forfeit 
his right of distribution by entering into a licensing 
 142. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089 
(N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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agreement.”143  One Stop relied on Harmony and ISC-
Bunker.144  The authorities cited by these decisions can be 
traced to the earlier Fifth Circuit decision, American 
International Pictures v. Foreman.145 
American International Pictures addressed the question 
of burden of proof to prove title to a film print where the 
defendant/reseller raised the first sale doctrine as a defense 
to a claim of copyright infringement by the plaintiff/film 
producers.146  The chain of title in the copies at issue was not 
proved and the lower court found in favor of the party in 
possession of the copyrighted article relying on common law 
doctrines for real and personal property.147  The Fifth Circuit 
not only reversed the lower court but criticized and rejected 
its reasoning finding it inapplicable to a case involving 
intellectual property.148 
The Fifth Circuit cited and relied upon the earlier Second 
Circuit decision authored by Judge Friendly, Platt & Munk 
Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc.149  In Platt, a decision in the 
pre-digital era of 1963, the Second Circuit considered the 
question of whether an unpaid manufacturer under contract 
with a copyright holder could avail itself of the common law 
self-help remedy of selling (otherwise disposing of) the 
manufactured merchandise (under copyright protection) in 
order to satisfy an unpaid bill by the copyright holder.150  
Platt considered carefully the arguments of both sides, 
copyright holder and manufacturer, and found both of them 
unpersuasive.151  The Second Circuit chose a third path which 
was to grant the unpaid manufacturer the right to seek 
adjudication in court to determine whether the copyright 
holder’s failure to satisfy the contract was unjustified.152  
Only then would the manufacturer have the right under first 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 
208, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); ISC-Bunker, 765 F. Supp. at 1314. 
 146. See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP II), 576 F.2d 661, 664. 
 147. See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP I), 400 F. Supp. 928, 934–35 
(S.D. Ala. 1975). 
 148. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 664–65. 
 149. Id. at 664. 
 150. See Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d 
Cir. 1963). 
 151. Id. at 851–53. 
 152. Id. at 855. 
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sale doctrine to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
merchandise.153 
The Second Circuit devoted some effort to explaining the 
control a copyright holder exercises in the rightful transfer of 
its title in any object containing its copyright.154  In response 
to the manufacturer arguing that it had lawful possession of 
the merchandise for purposes of the first sale doctrine, the 
Second Circuit cited the example of the book agent who had 
rights of possession in a book, not authority to sell the book, 
and thus the party who purchased the book never received 
rightful title to the book.155  The Second Circuit stated: 
[I]t does not matter whether the party offering to sell 
without [the proprietor’s] authority be a thief, or one in 
possession only by a breach of trust, or [by] some other 
less blamable means of acquisition. The absence of [the 
proprietor’s] authority to sell his literary property 
constitutes the defect of title, no matter how that want of 
authority arises. Owing to the peculiar character of 
this kind of property, the absence of the author’s 
authority to sell is a defect of title, and not a mere want of 
power.156 
The Second Circuit’s reference to an “absence of 
authority” and “defect of title” appeared to support a strong 
“property rights” approach; it implied that the property 
owner, or copyright holder, must authorize the transfer of 
title.  The Second Circuit appeared to have implied that this 
is the general rule but under certain circumstances 
exceptions were warranted.  The opinion turned to the 
specific facts of the case and noted that under some 
circumstances transfer of title could be compelled and that 
this was one of those situations before the court.157  The 
Second Circuit found that the copyright holder could not 
unjustifiably avoid the obligations of a contract as it had 
argued in the briefs.158 
Nevertheless, the copyright holder was entitled to 
differential treatment from a chattel owner (i.e. non-
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 852. 
 155. Id. at 854. 
 156. Id. at 852 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. at 854. 
 158. Id. at 855. 
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copyrighted property).  Turning to the question of whether 
the manufacturer could avail itself of the self-help remedy 
available for chattel, the Second Circuit found special 
preferences for a federal created right under copyright law: 
Where the copyright owner makes a good faith claim that 
its failure to pay for the goods was justified, the 
manufacturer ought not to be allowed to resort to the 
normal remedy of self-help with the result of impairing 
the rights granted by federal copyright law; to that extent 
state contract or lien law must yield to the federally 
created right.159 
Platt enunciated the principle that a federally created 
right of copyright may be treated differently when there is a 
clash or conflict with state derived rights.  Platt did not cite 
any direct authority for this principle.  This raised the 
question of why should manufactured goods, such as 
childrens’ toys, in the Platt fact pattern be treated differently 
because there was a copyright associated with those 
particular manufactured goods?  One explanation could be 
the hierarchy of rights, copyright traces its source of 
authority to the federal Constitution Article I.  Platt was not 
analyzed or decided on the basis of preemption so that does 
not satisfactorily answer the question.  Another possibility 
relates to an assumption of the underlying theory of copyright 
that motivated and drove the reasoning of Platt.  As discussed 
supra, copyright law (as well as patent law) has traditionally 
rested on a utilitarian theoretical justification most commonly 
understood as the “traditional incentives” model that 
balances protection with access.  However, natural rights 
theory has also been a competing justification for copyright. 
Platt evidenced a natural rights justification for copyright.  
Its opinion included a great deal of doctrine supporting strong 
rights for the copyright holder.  As discussed below, the Fifth 
Circuit in American International Pictures, was influenced by 
this part of the Second Circuit’s opinion. 
The reasoning of the opinion in AIP II evidenced a 
doctrine referred to herein as “inherent rights” characterized 
by strong ownership rights vested in the copyright holder. 
This copyright doctrine runs through the subsequent software 
first sale decisions of Harmony and ISC-Bunker.  As dis-
 159. Id. 
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cussed infra, the “inherent rights” doctrine provides a more 
coherent rationale for the pro-software outcomes than the 
contract based reasoning expressed in the contemporary 
decisions of One Stop, Stargate, and Vernor II. 
B. Articulation of the “Inherent Rights” Doctrine of Copyright 
Ownership: American International Pictures 
In its opinion, American International Pictures, the Fifth 
Circuit addressed the question of burden of proof to prove 
title to a film print.160  The defendant, a merchant trading in 
film prints, had been sued by the film producers who argued 
that they had not given authorization to transfer title to the 
films.  The lower court found in favor of the defendant, the 
party in possession of the copyrighted article, relying on 
common law doctrines for real and personal property.161  
Analogizing to common law principles of chattel governing 
questions of title, the defendant argued that title should be 
presumed as the copyrighted work had entered the stream of 
commerce.  The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court.162  If 
EFF had been around in 1978, it might have sounded a 
similar alarm at the Fifth Circuit’s decision in American 
International Pictures.  Similarly to Timothy Vernor, a 
merchant trading on eBay, AIP II’s decision and rationale 
could have been argued to have a chilling effect on secondary 
markets. 
The Fifth Circuit cited dicta from Platt that “an 
unwitting purchaser who buys a copy in the secondary 
market can be held liable for infringement if the copy was not 
the subject of a first sale by the copyright holder.”163  As 
discussed supra, Platt articulated the principle that the 
federal right of copyright may support differential treatment 
for copyrighted works when in conflict with state derived 
common law rights.  In holding for the film print reseller, the 
district court in AIP I had relied on the common law 
principles of property that possession is a rebuttable 
presumption and serves the public good by supporting the 
“free circulation of goods in commerce.”164  These principles 
 160. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 663–64. 
 161. See AIP I, 400 F. Supp. at 934–35. 
 162. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665–66. 
 163. Id. at 664. 
 164. See AIP I, 400 F. Supp. at 933. 
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are consistent with the utilitarian theory associated with 
“traditional incentives” model, which favors secondary 
markets and greater access and availability of creative works. 
The Fifth Circuit, however, expressly criticized and 
rejected the lower court’s reasoning finding it inapplicable to 
a case involving intellectual property.165  The Fifth Circuit, 
consistent with a natural rights justification, argued that 
copyright law bestowed strong rights in the copyright holder: 
Here the plaintiffs’ evidence established a course of 
conduct, unrebutted as to the specific films in the 
complaint, consistent with an intention to retain all the 
rights associated with the grant of copyright to the films 
in question.  We have located no copyright case holding 
that possession of a copy by a third person overcomes the 
rights of the copyright holder in such circumstances.  
Rather, because copyright law favors the rights of the 
copyright holder, the person claiming authority to copy 
or vend generally must show that his authority to do so 
flows from the copyright holder.166 
“Course of conduct” referred to the film producers’ 
practice of executing agreements with parties who received 
copies of film prints, stating that no transfer of title in the 
film print had been granted.167  The court went on to clearly 
state that a copyright holder can avoid the trigger of first sale 
doctrine through such a course of conduct: 
The [film producer]’s evidence, although flawed by its 
generality and gaps in the personal knowledge of the 
corporate witnesses, demonstrated that the [film 
producer] had consistently attempted to retain title 
(emphasis added) to the films involved in the complaint.  
[The film print reseller]’s evidence, suggesting that first 
sales of other films had been made, demonstrated only 
that [copyright holder] had not treated all films 
consistently.  [The film print reseller]’s general evidence, 
unrelated to any film in the complaint, thus left 
unrebutted the [film producer]’s proof that, whatever their 
treatment of other films, they had consistently avoided 
 165. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 664–65. 
 166. Id. at 665.  (emphasis added).  The Fifth Circuit does not cite Bobbs-
Merrill.  This Article argues that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in AIP II is in 
direct conflict with Bobbs-Merrill.  See infra Part III.B. 
 167. See id. 
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first sales of the films in this suit.168 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court, and debunked 
the idea that presumption of possession was lawful.169  The 
district court judge was persuaded by defendant’s testimony 
that many of the agreements that film producers used seemed 
more like a sale than a lease.170  In one case with United 
Artists Corporation (“UA”), UA had distributed motion 
picture prints as “life-of-print” leases but the court found that 
the terms of the transaction, single lump sum payment and 
no obligation to return the print seemed more like a sale.171  
The Fifth Circuit, however, was not persuaded.  They found 
that defendant could not trace the particular film prints at 
issue to a legal document evidencing a sale.172 
The key terms for the Fifth Circuit were “intent” and 
“course of conduct.”  The Fifth Circuit did not expressly name 
a new doctrine in copyright law; however, the reasoning of the 
Fifth Circuit decision supports a copyright doctrine of 
inherent rights of the copyright holder.  To determine intent 
the court fashioned a standard, the “course of conduct,” to 
determine if the copyright holder demonstrated its 
manifested intent to retain title in its copyrighted works.  The 
Fifth Circuit cited several authorities for general principles 
that support a copyright doctrine of “inherent rights.”  They 
included control by the copyright holder in the retention of 
rights, deference to the copyright holders’ intent regarding 
any transfer of those rights, and even preferences granted to 
ownership rights of copyright holders in the objects or 
products containing that copyright compared to owners of 
general chattel.173 
For the principle of the control of the rights associated 
with copyright ownership, the Fifth Circuit cited another 
Fifth Circuit decision, Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie 
Manufacturing Co.,174 claiming that “the copyright certificate 
 168. Id. at 665–66. 
 169. See id. at 664–65. 
 170. See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP I), 400 F. Supp. 928, 934 
(S.D. Ala. 1975). 
 171. See id. at 932. 
 172. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665–66. 
 173. See id. at 665. 
 174. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970). 
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is prima facie evidence that the copyright holder retains all 
rights granted by the copyright.”175  Deference to the 
copyright holder was stated by the Fifth Circuit in its 
statement that “copyright law favors the rights of the 
copyright holder, the person claiming authority to copy or 
vend generally must show that his authority to do so flows 
from the copyright holder.”176  It cited several district court 
decisions in the Second Circuit.177  The court summed up this 
principle with the statement that: “[n]one of these cases 
suggests that mere possession of a copy is sufficient to meet 
this burden.”178 
Applying the “inherent rights” doctrine and the 
corresponding  “course of conduct” standard derived from the 
reasoning of AIP II, the issue is framed as a copyright one: 
has there been a voluntary transfer of title such that the one 
in possession of a copy of the work should be treated as an 
owner for purposes of the first sale doctrine.  If the content 
producer has established a course of conduct of consistently 
licensing the software copies, and expressly retaining its title 
in such copies, then its licensee is a “rightful possessor” of 
such copyrightable copy, but first sale doctrine is not 
triggered.  Where a course of conduct is established then the 
burden is on the possessor to show that the copyright holder 
did transfer title in a first sale such that the copyholder’s 
exclusive right to distribute became subject to the first sale 
doctrine. 
The divergent outcomes between the lower court and the 
Fifth Circuit reflect the competing copyright theories at work.  
The lower court had followed the traditional utilitarian 
theory of copyright that deadweight losses from monopoly 
copyright are offset by traditional doctrines such as first sale 
that promote greater accessibility and availability of 
copyrighted works.  The Fifth Circuit, influenced by the 
Second Circuit in Platt, followed the competing natural rights 
 175. AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 191 
(D.C.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); Edward B. Marks Music 
Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 47 F. Supp. 490 (D.C.N.Y. 1942), aff’d, 140 F.2d 
266 (2d Cir. 1944), modified, 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944); Schellberg v. 
Empringham, 36 F.2d 991 (D.C.N.Y. 1929). 
 178. See AIP II, 576 F.2d at 665. 
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justification for copyright, and felt little concern about 
circumscribing the effect of the first sale doctrine.  The 
language of AIP II such as emphasis on need to show 
“voluntary transfer” of title clearly supports a theory of strong 
property rights vested in the copyright holder.  As discussed 
supra, the “natural rights” influence on the “inherent rights” 
doctrine has historical roots in the early development of 
copyright in the U.S.179 
C. Application of the “Inherent Rights” Copyright Doctrine to 
Software: ISC-Bunker and Harmony 
ISC-Bunker and Harmony were two software decisions 
involving first sale doctrine that looked to the progenitor 
American International Pictures for guidance on the question 
of whether the “possessor” of the software had the benefit of 
the first sale doctrine in a claim by the copyright holder for 
infringement.180  ISC-Bunker involved a company, ISC-
Bunker Ramo Corp. (“ISC”), who serviced computers and sold 
used computers.181  Part of ISC’s business model was not only 
to sell computer systems, which included a license to the 
software contained therein, but also provide maintenance and 
support to its customers.  It sued its competitor, Altech, 
arguing that Altech had infringed its copyright in the 
software contained in the computer systems.182  In the other 
case, Microsoft sued Harmony, a software reseller, for 
committing copyright infringement by the unauthorized 
unbundling and reselling its software.183 
Citing American International Pictures, ISC-Bunker 
found that “Altech had no authority to possess ISC’s 
software.”184  The court reasoned that any such authority 
must come from ISC, who, as the copyright holder, has the 
exclusive right to control distribution of its software.  The 
court found that “ISC, through its licensing agreements, 
has specifically limited distribution to licensed customers 
 179. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1023; see supra Part I.A. 
 180. See ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 
(N.D. Ill. 1990); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. 
Supp. 208, 212, 212–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 181. See ISC-Bunker, 765 F. Supp. at 1314. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Harmony, 846 F. Supp. at 210. 
 184. See ISC-Bunker, 765 F. Supp. at 1331 (emphasis added). 
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only, and proscribed any further distribution of its 
software.”185  Finally, the court concluded that “Altech has no 
lawful right to possess ISC software, and has acquired no 
title (emphasis added) to or other rights in that software.”186 
ISC-Bunker’s statement of the authority of the copyright 
holder to determine the transfer of title harkened back to 
Platt’s statement that the “absence of the author’s authority 
to sell is a defect of title.”187  This is also consistent with the 
natural rights theory of copyright.  Authority is derived solely 
from the intention of the copyright holder.  The court’s 
reference to ISC’s conduct “through its licensing agreements” 
was similar to AIP II’s description of the film publishers’ 
behavior as a “course of conduct” demonstrating its intent to 
retain rights of ownership in a copyrighted article while 
making such article available to the public.  That standard 
“course of conduct” as enunciated by AIP II was followed in 
ISC-Bunker with its analysis of the copyright holders’ general 
practices in its licensing agreements of retaining rights of 
title in the copyrighted material.  ISC-Bunker applied a 
copyright “inherent rights” doctrine based on principles of 
manifested intent of the copyright holder rather than contract 
principles that would analyze the mutual intention of the 
parties. 
Harmony considered whether the first sale doctrine 
shielded a reseller of software products from a claim of 
copyright infringement by the software producer/copyright 
holder, Microsoft.188  This reseller had not entered into an 
agreement directly with Microsoft but had purchased the 
products from another reseller, then resold those products in 
violation of the licensing restrictions.189  After stating the first 
sale doctrine, the court applied the standard from AIP II, 
word for word, referring directly to the AIP II language of 
“chain of title” and “course of conduct.”190 
Harmony found that a copyright holder may license its 
rights and still retain the title such that first sale doctrine is 
 185. Id. (emphasis added). 
 186. Id. (emphasis added). 
 187. Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 
1963) (emphasis added). 
 188. See Harmony, 846 F. Supp. at 210. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 213. 
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not triggered: 
Defendant’s failure to trace their Microsoft Products to a 
“first sale” by the copyright holder is aggravated by the 
fact that plaintiff has “established a course of conduct  
. . . consistent with an intention to retain all the rights 
associated with the grant of copyright” of the Microsoft 
Products.191 
Just like in AIP II, there was no discussion in Harmony 
of contract principles of mutual assent of the parties, but only 
a copyright analysis of the demonstrated intent by the 
copyright holder to retain its rights of ownership in the 
copyrighted article.  Ultimately the Fifth Circuit in AIP II, as 
the Eastern District Court of New York did later in Harmony, 
concluded that the copyright holder had retained its rights of 
ownership and not transferred title such that first sale 
doctrine would apply. 
In Harmony the reseller claimed that the first sale 
doctrine applied because he had acquired the software 
through a valid licensing agreement.192  The court in 
Harmony cited ISC-Bunker, rejecting that rationale: 
“Entering a license agreement is not a ‘sale’ for purposes of 
the first sale doctrine.”193 
ISC-Bunker, as discussed supra, built on AIP II’s 
copyright rationale of inherent rights.  The court 
distinguished a (rightful) possession of a copyrighted article, 
without title to the article because the copyright holder chose 
to retain the title, from one who has received an authorized 
transfer of title from the copyright holder.  Harmony made 
this distinction even clearer when it stated that “the only 
chain of distribution that Microsoft authorizes is one in which 
all possessors of Microsoft Products have only a license to use, 
rather than actual ownership of the Products.”194  The 
rationale in both of these decisions is consistent with natural 
rights theory of copyright. 
In Harmony, the “possessor” of the software, was a 
reseller who did not intend to install or use the software and 
had not entered into a reseller agreement with the software 
 191. Id. (emphasis added). 
 192. See id. at 210. 
 193. Id. at 213. 
 194. Id. 
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producer/copyright holder, Microsoft.  This did not matter to 
the court because it followed AIP III’s copyright doctrine of 
“inherent rights” of ownership.  A copyright holder’s rights 
cannot be abridged by a third party even an innocent third 
party.  Harmony stated: 
A licensee who has failed to satisfy a condition of the 
license or has materially breached the licensing contract 
has no rights to give a sublicensee under which the 
sublicensee can take cover in a copyright infringement 
case, and therefore, both the licensee and the sublicensee 
can be held liable for acting without authorization and 
thereby infringing the licensor’s copyright.195 
Finally, the court addressed the question of whether the 
software producer had a claim of copyright infringement or 
breach of contract.  The court noted that in this case it was 
clearly copyright infringement because there was no privity 
between the parties.196  It noted, however, that even if there 
had been a distribution agreement between the parties the 
copyright holder/software producer could have still brought a 
copyright infringement claim for exceeding the scope of the 
copyright license.197  Harmony recognized the lack of privity 
in the reseller fact pattern, something that the later pro-
software decisions failed to do. 
Harmony expressly followed AIP II’s inherent rights 
doctrine of copyright ownership.  The copyright holder may 
expressly retain title in its distribution of the product.  The 
spirit of Platt lived on through AIP II, then in the digital age, 
in the opinions of ISC-Bunker and Harmony.  Platt had 
emphasized that an “absence of the author’s authority to sell 
is a defect of title.”198  Harmony interpreted this to mean that 
where the copyright holder expressly retains title, no transfer 
has occurred, and there is no first sale. 
The “inherent rights” rationale based on natural rights 
theory runs through ISC-Bunker and Harmony.  It is 
predicated on the assumption that the copyright holders, in 
these cases software producers, rather than toy producers or 
film producers, needed greater protection as a reward for 
 195. Id. at 214. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Platt & Monk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
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their contribution to societal welfare.  The rationales and 
outcomes of these decisions are aligned in a purely natural 
rights theory of copyright, but they are also consistent with 
the “property rights” paradigm.  The “inherent rights” 
rationale forms the natural rights branch of the hybrid 
“property rights” paradigm that includes the utilitarian 
strand of economic theory inspired by the work of Harold 
Demsetz. 
Next, the Article turns to the district court decisions in 
One Stop and Stargate, then the Ninth Circuit decision in 
Vernor II.  All of these decisions reached a pro-software 
outcome; however, the analytical break from AIP II’s coherent 
copyright analysis, and the attempt to inject contract 
principles into the rationale of the decision, diminished the 
justificatory force of these decisions.  Their rationales and 
outcomes are misaligned; the jurisprudential foundation of 
the “property rights” paradigm provides coherency to their 
outcomes finding in favor of the content (software) producer. 
D.  Analytical Break – Conflating Contract with Copyright  
Analysis: One Stop and Stargate 
In One Stop, Adobe brought a copyright action and the 
Northern District Court of California began its analysis citing 
the copyright doctrine of first sale.199  Then, it quickly shifted 
to an analysis that resembled a contract theory approach.  By 
framing the question as whether the transaction at issue 
constituted a sale or a license, the court began a lengthy 
investigation and analysis of the contract at issue and the 
circumstances surrounding the particular transaction.200  The 
statement that “the Court must give effect to the mutual 
intention of the parties” (emphasis added) most 
transparently revealed the contract theory approach 
employed by the court.201  One Stop’s opinion set up this 
discussion with the section sub-heading: “OCRA—sale or 
license;” OCRA an acronym for the title of the agreement that 
Adobe used to document the transaction.202  After a few 
sentences referring to the relevant copyright statute and a 
 199. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089 
(N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 200. See id. at 1090. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 1089. 
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few prior decisions on the copyright doctrine, the court then 
devoted several pages to detailed references to the language 
of the agreement and testimony from the parties related to 
the commercial practices of the parties.  It went on to state, 
“The parties’ intent is inferred exclusively from the language 
of the contract, assuming the language is ‘clear and 
explicit.’ ” 203  The court found that the transaction was a 
license and first sale doctrine did not apply.204 
Two years after One Stop, Adobe brought a copyright 
infringement suit against another reseller, Stargate, under 
similar circumstances again in the Northern District Court of 
California.205  Similar to One Stop, the court zigzagged in 
method from copyright analysis to contract analysis.  After a 
brief introduction to first sale doctrine, it quickly turned to an 
examination of the agreement at issue to determine if there 
had been a sale, triggering the first sale doctrine.206  The 
court found it important that the agreement imposed 
numerous restrictions on title, citing the restriction that 
resellers distribute pursuant to the terms of a EULA.207  
There was less testimony from various parties on software 
licensing practices as in One Stop, but the court quoted from 
One Stop that “these numerous restrictions imposed by Adobe 
indicate a license rather than a sale because they undeniably 
interfere with reseller’s ability to further distribute the 
software.”208  This rationale can not be grounded in contract 
theory because of the absence of vertical privity.  “Inherent 
rights” doctrine, grounded in natural rights theory, offers a 
cogent rationale for the district court’s outcome.  It supports 
the unilateral right of the copyright holder to place limits on 
the distribution of its copyrighted works. 
In Stargate, the reseller raised the “economic realities” 
argument, lifted directly from the opinion of Softman, the 
intervening decision between One Stop and Stargate, from the 
Central District of California, that had ruled against 
 203. Id. at 1090. 
 204. See id. at 1092. 
 205. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 
1052–53 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 206. See id. at 1055–56. 
 207. Id. at 1057. 
 208. Id. (citing One Stop, 84 F. Supp. at 1091). 
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Adobe.209  Instead of relying on copyright analysis the 
Northern District of California responded in kind arguing 
that the transaction at issue, repeating the phrase “economic 
realities” of the transaction, favored its finding that by the 
terms of the license agreement at issue there was no sale and 
thus no triggering of first sale.210 
The court’s statements that “Adobe has elected (emphasis 
added) to distribute its products via license rather than sale,” 
as well as statement that “Adobe characterizes each 
transaction it concluded through the entire stream of 
commerce (emphasis added) relevant,” hinted at something 
different than a contract theory approach but were 
undeveloped.211  This could have been developed more fully to 
support of a copyright theory approach based on the “inherent 
rights” doctrine enunciated by AIP II, and followed by 
Harmony and ISC-Bunker.  Falling back to contract 
principles, Stargate wrapped up its opinion by opining on the 
importance to society of the “right to contract freely.”212  Here 
the court harkened back to its earlier opinion in One Stop 
when it stated the importance of “giving effect to the mutual 
intention of the parties.”213  This also echoed the faulty 
reasoning of ProCD and Bowers claiming that the effect of 
their decision was really limited because of an imagined 
version of privity.214 
One Stop and Stargate represent the fragile link to the 
earlier first sale decisions of AIP II, Harmony, and ISC-
Bunker, that unabashedly applied a copyright doctrine of 
“inherent rights” consistent with a “property rights” 
justification for copyright law.  They also represent the 
analytical break where the court applied flawed contract 
reasoning instead of relying expressly on the “property rights” 
 209. See SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 
(C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 210. See Stargate, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. 
 211. Id. at 1056. 
 212. Id. at 1059.  Judge Ware quoted directly from the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
opinion, when it stated that “[t]he right to contract freely with the expectation 
that the contract shall endure according to its terms is as fundamental to the 
society as the right to write and to speak without restraint.”  Blount v. Smith, 
12 Ohio St. 2d 41, 47 (1967). 
 213. See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090 
(N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 214. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); Bowers v. 
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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theory that offers justificatory force to its outcome.  This 
misdirection becomes more apparent in the Ninth Circuit’s 
Vernor II decision, which made no explicit reference to those 
earlier pro-copyright holder decisions. 
E. Alternative Rationale for Vernor v. Autodesk (Vernor II) 
On September 10, 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
decision of the District Court of the Western District of 
Washington, and found that the licensing agreement used by 
Autodesk prevented Timothy Vernor from benefiting from the 
first sale doctrine.215  Timothy Vernor, who had purchased an 
authentic copy of Autodesk software from a third party, had 
attempted to resell such software on eBay.  The license 
agreement attached to the software restricted its use to the 
initial purchaser and prohibited further transfer without 
Autodesk’s express permission.  Timothy Vernor had claimed 
that the first sale doctrine shielded his sale of the software 
from an action of copyright infringement.  The lower court 
had found in favor of Timothy Vernor. 
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit carried out a strained 
examination of its own precedent, United States v. Wise,216 a 
criminal prosecution case, and the MAI trio, § 117 cases.217  
United States v. Wise was a Ninth Circuit decision from the 
late 1970’s involving criminal prosecution of distribution of 
film prints.  In that decision, the court found that in the case 
of certain film prints (not all, or even a majority) the 
Government had failed to meet its burden of proof that there 
was an absence of first sale, such that the defendant would be 
guilty of copyright infringement. In those instances the court 
found a number of factors important to its decision including 
the factor of indefinite possession.218  The lower court in 
Vernor I found that factor critical to the outcome of the 
decision.219 
 
 215. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 216. See Vernor II, 621 F.3d at 1110–11. 
 217. See id. at 1111. 
 218. Id.  The doctrine enunciated by Wise was as opaque as the murky fact 
situation in the case. 
 219. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor I), 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 
(W.D. Wash. 2008). 
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The Ninth Circuit considered the District Court’s decision 
to rely on Wise but found that the two decisions were not in 
direct conflict, arguing that the earlier decision, Wise, stated 
several factors to consider, none of which were dispositive.220  
The Ninth Circuit finally arrived at its holding by examining 
the specific license agreement in question and finding specific 
conditions that supported its multi-factor test finding that 
licensee was not an owner for purposes of first sale.221  
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found that its holding was 
consistent with its construction of both the MAI trio and 
Wise.222 
Examining the specific license agreement would indicate 
a contract theory approach similar to that employed in One 
Stop and Stargate.  The Ninth Circuit appeared to really re-
fashion Wise by developing the three factor test to determine 
whether the transaction was a license or a sale.  All the 
factors, including label of license, restrictions on transfer and 
notable use restrictions, required an examination of the 
language of the specific license agreement.  This approach 
suffered from the same analytical error as One Stop and 
Stargate as it required the illogical leap to hold a party, the 
reseller, not in privity to the software producer/copyright 
holder bound to an agreement under a contract theory.  In 
copyright, any user of a copyrighted article, whether or not in 
privity with the rights holder, can be held liable for 
infringement of the rights of the copyright holder. 
In MAI trio,223 there were three decisions by the Ninth 
Circuit that construed § 117 and involved the question of 
whether the defendant could be considered an “owner” for 
purposes of benefiting from § 117’s safe harbor from copyright 
infringement.  Starting with MAI v. Peak’s famous footnote 
stating that where software is licensed, the users cannot 
qualify as owners, the other decisions followed suit in their 
construction of § 117.224  In Vernor I, the lower court did not 
 220. See Vernor II, 621 F.3d at 1110–11. 
 221. Id. at 1111, 1113. 
 222. Id. at 1111. 
 223. Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 785 
(9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 
1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
[hereinafter, collectively, the MAI trio]. 
 224. See MAI, 991 F.2d at 519 n.5.  The Ninth Circuit stated in this often 
quoted footnote, “[s]ince MAI licensed its software, the Peak customers do not 
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challenge that interpretation even for a parallel application of 
a § 117 construction to a § 109 (first sale) fact pattern and 
decision.  In fact Vernor I stated that if it followed MAI trio 
decisions it would find in favor of Autodesk.225  The lower 
court had found that these decisions were irreconcilably in 
conflict and chose to rely on Wise, for the putative reason that 
it followed Ninth Circuit precedent of choosing the earlier 
decision in conflicting decisions.226 
The Ninth Circuit in Vernor II reached a pro-software 
producer outcome consistent with its heritage of pro-content 
producer decisions but without arguably a satisfactory 
rationale for that result as suggested by commentators.227  
The analytical break from AIP II’s rationale began with One 
Stop but was complete with the Vernor II’s decision.  The 
Ninth Circuit seemed to be completely unaware of earlier 
precedent in the area of first sale doctrine, beginning with 
American International Pictures and Platt, and continuing 
through Harmony and ISC-Bunker.228  One Stop cited ISC-
Bunker, quoted from Harmony, but failed to fully appreciate 
and follow their copyright theory approach.  One is left 
understanding Vernor II either based on (a) the thin reed of 
statutory construction of MAI Trio of the related § 117 
doctrine; or (b) a re-fashioned construction of Wise based on a 
weak contract theory that the parties intended to restrict title 
in this particular transaction. 
qualify as ‘owners’ of the software and are not eligible for protection under 
Section 117.”  Professor Carver argued that “the entire framing of the question 
as one of ‘license versus sale’ presents a false dichotomy that should be 
avoided.”  See Carver, supra note 12 at 1934. 
 225. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor I), 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 
(W.D. Wash. 2008). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1900. 
 228. Cf. The Ninth Circuit referred briefly to two Supreme Court decisions 
involving first sale doctrine.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 
1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010).  In dicta in Quality King, the Court referred to 
Section 109 (d), which lists exceptions to the Section 109 first sale rule, such as 
bailee and lessee.  Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l Inc., 523 
U.S. 135, 147 (1998).  Surprisingly the Court added in its opinion, “licensee,” 
although that term or category does not exist in the actual statute.  Id.  The 
Ninth Circuit also discussed Bobbs-Merrill for its reference to a lack of a 
contract or licensing agreement between the parties.  Vernor II, 621 F.3d at 
1107.  As discussed infra, the Ninth Circuit looked narrowly at the language of 
Bobbs-Merrill, missing its reference to a lack of privity between the parties.  
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908). 
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Like the District Court of Northern California in One 
Stop and Stargate, the Ninth Circuit did evidence some spirit 
of AIP II by describing Autodesk’s global licensing practice 
and policy in its opinion. Vernor II described Autodesk’s 
licensing practices as one where it reserves title to the 
software copies.229  Discussing in more detail the practices, 
the Ninth Circuit stated: 
Since at least 1986, Autodesk has offered AutoCAD to 
customers pursuant to an accompanying software license 
agreement (“SLA”) . . . The SLA . . . first recites that 
Autodesk retains title to all copies . . . .  [I]t imposes 
transfer restrictions, prohibiting customers from renting, 
leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk’s 
prior consent . . . .230 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that “Autodesk takes 
measures to enforce these license requirements.”231  All of the 
above can be coherently rationalized by the “inherent rights” 
doctrine of copyright ownership, and the natural rights 
branch of the “property rights” paradigm of copyright.  The 
copyright holders had established a “course of conduct” 
consistent with an intention to retain all the rights associated 
with the grant of copyright to the material at issue.  Arguably 
the multi-factor test developed by the Ninth Circuit test that 
in Vernor II was really a restatement of AIP’s “course of 
conduct” standard. 
Neither of the factors that the district court in Vernor I 
believed to be dispositive appeared in the final test that the 
Ninth Circuit fashioned for analyzing the question of whether 
the transaction should be treated as a sale or a license.  The 
Ninth Circuit all but ignored the importance of factors of 
“indefinite possession” or “full price” discussed in Wise.  In 
essence the surface doctrinal language of the opinion 
respected the precedent of Wise but not the outcome.  Those 
factors speak to the limits on control by the copyright holders’ 
right to control distribution of its creative works, and inform 
the “rightful possessor” theory advanced by the express 
reasoning of Softman. The “rightful possessor” rationale 
coherently fits with the “traditional incentives” theory of 
 229. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor II), 621 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 230. Id. at 1104. 
 231. Id. 
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copyright.232  On the other hand, the test fashioned by Vernor 
II, echoed its unclaimed heritage, namely an emphasis on the 
copyright holder’s power to unilaterally place reservations on 
title, effectively avoiding the first sale doctrine.  All of the 
pro-software producer decisions are consistent with the 
“property rights” based theory of copyright that relies on a 
natural rights justification, and believes that markets and 
private ordering are the best (if not exclusive) mechanism for 
production and allocation of creative works for the optimal 
societal welfare. 
III. TRADITIONAL INCENTIVES THEORY AND THE PRINCIPLES 
OF BOBBS-MERRILL 
Part II argued that the pro-software decisions suffered 
from analytical error of confusing contract with copyright 
analysis. Going a step further it also argued that the recent 
pro-software decisions, One Stop, Stargate, and Vernor II, 
could best be reconciled with their predecessor software 
decisions of Harmony and ISC-Bunker, as well as the pre-
digital pro-content producer decision of AIP II, and the 
doctrinal tenets of Platt, by rationalizing them with the 
“property rights” theory of intellectual property. 
At this point the reader may wonder why go further, 
what is there left to say.  Software producers were happy with 
the outcome of Vernor II.233  The state of digital commerce, 
however, is at a critical inflection point where the debate and 
discussion about the values that society expects to be 
promoted and upheld by copyright law demands more 
scrutiny and public debate.  As the title to Professor 
Rothchild’s article portends, the first sale doctrine is indeed 
“an incredible shrinking rule,” as the current trend of digital 
commerce is to shrink if not to eliminate any vestige of the 
first sale rule.  Book retailers, such as Amazon and Barnes & 
Noble, who distribute the popular e-book readers, Kindle and 
 232. See infra notes 246–70 and accompanying text. 
 233. See Steven Seidenberg, Court Ruling May Give Copyright Owners More 
Restricting Rights, INSIDE COUNSEL (Dec. 2010), available at  
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/December-2010/Pages/Court-Ruling-
May-Give-Copyright-Owners-Restricting-Rights.aspx?page=1 (“What this ruling 
[Vernor v. Autodesk decision] means to software companies is that they can 
continue business as usual,” says Suzanne Bell, a partner at Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati, quoted in this Article.). 
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Nook, are accomplishing in the marketplace what Bobbs-
Merrill renounced at the turn of the last century.  Consumers 
who purchase the reader can download full texts of a book 
and keep the book “indefinitely” but they are prevented from 
fully exercising the traditional rights of first sale, namely to 
transfer or otherwise dispose of that copy of the book at their 
pleasure.  The Kindle, in books, and the iPod, in music, 
illustrate the emergence of tethered devices where the 
consumer can only access the content through proprietary 
interfaces controlled by the content producer. 
Although currently the minority view, the “traditional 
incentives” theory of intellectual property forms the best fit, 
in my opinion, with the principles of the progenitor first sale 
decision, Bobbs-Merrill, as well as the plain language of the 
constitutional mandate for the intellectual property regime. 
Part III begins with an examination of the principles 
enunciated by Bobbs-Merrill and analyzes how those 
principles should animate the analysis and construction of 
the first sale doctrine.  To understand the divergence in the 
current debate, it is helpful to apply the Bobbs-Merrill 
analysis to the historical decisions of Platt and AIP II.  As 
argued supra, Platt can be read to find a narrower 
construction of its opinion then adherents of the “property 
rights” theory may be inclined; however AIP II’s analysis 
cannot be harmonized with Bobbs-Merrill and represents the 
harbinger of the “property” approach to the first sale doctrine 
as held by the current majority view.  Then, the discussion 
turns to the “minority” view decisions of AIP I, Softman, and 
Vernor I, and how they can be understood in the context of 
the principles of Bobbs-Merrill.  Although the fact patterns 
and outcomes of these minority decisions are consistent with 
Bobbs-Merrill, they failed to rationalize their decisions with 
the principles and analysis of Bobbs-Merrill. 
Finally, the Article proposes a model of “constructive 
ownership” building on the “rightful possessor” theory of 
ownership but adding a third prong for the special case of 
software.  This model if adopted by the courts would limit 
Vernor II to its facts applying to most cases of software 
(assuming it met the conditions of the model) but not to other 
digital media.  It is the contention of this Article that this 
“constructive ownership” model more faithfully fulfills the 
promises of Bobbs-Merrill and the original intention of the 
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constitutional mandate for the intellectual property regime. 
A. Bobbs-Merrill Doctrine on First Sale 
The first sale doctrine was first promulgated in the 
Supreme Court decision, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus in 
1908.234  The Court held that the exclusive right to “vend” 
under the copyright statute applied only to the first sale of 
the copyrighted work.235  In that case the publisher, Bobbs-
Merrill, had attempted to control the re-sale price of a 
particular book, “The Castaway,” by inserting in the inside 
cover of the book a notice stating that it was a violation of its 
copyright to sell such copy of the book for less than one 
dollar.236  The retailer, Macy’s, attempted to do so and was 
sued by the publisher for copyright infringement.237 
Bobbs-Merrill, the publisher and copyright owner, had 
argued that its exclusive right to vend (distribute) included 
the right to determine how much of that right it parted with 
and how much it retained to itself.238  The Court responded by 
framing the question in a way that transparently revealed 
the Court’s concern about the effect of the copyright holder’s 
intent to unilaterally determine the scope and meaning of the 
right to vend.  To the question of what does the statute mean 
in granting the right to vend, the Court responded: 
Was it intended to create a right which would permit the 
holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book or 
upon one of the articles mentioned within the statute, a 
restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the 
subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted 
with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over 
it and had given a satisfactory price for it?239 
To that rhetorical question, the Court answered in the 
negative.240  The similarity between the pointed references by 
the Court to the salient characteristics of that case and those 
of the current software cases in the Ninth Circuit is striking.  
In 1908, the Court referred to (a) a notice affixed to the 
 234. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 339 (1908). 
 235. See id. at 350–51. 
 236. Id. at 341. 
 237. Id. at 341–42. 
 238. Id. at 349–50. 
 239. Id. (emphasis added). 
 240. See id. at 350. 
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copyright article; (b) one who had acquired “full dominion” 
over the article, and (c) one had paid a “satisfactory price” for 
the article.241  In 2010, Vernor II considered a case where the 
reseller Timothy Vernor had purchased a copy of software 
with a EULA attached to it, and there were no further 
obligations of payment or return.  Similar parallel 
construction can be drawn with pro-software decisions, One 
Stop and Stargate, as well decisions, Softman and Vernor I, 
finding against the software producer. 
Vernor II hurriedly dismissed Bobbs-Merrill with a 
reference to the statement that in the Bobbs-Merrill opinion 
the case before it did not involve a claim of a contract 
limitation or license agreement.  However, what Vernor II 
failed to notice was that in the next sentence the Court re-
stated its holding but with the particular caveat that between 
these parties there was no privity of contract.  As discussed 
supra, this is the fatal flaw of the reasoning of the pro-
software decisions.  Finding privity between Timothy Vernor 
and Autodesk, or between the resellers, One Stop and 
Stargate, and the software producer, Adobe, is simply 
illusory.  The only difference between Macy’s, as a retailer, in 
1908 and the resellers of current era, is the later adoption of 
the UCC and the courts apparent practice of seeing privity 
everywhere and nowhere. 
As a result of Bobbs-Merrill, consumers can exercise the 
right to lend, sell or otherwise dispose of their copies of books, 
DVD’s and CD’s.  Apart from legislative action restricting the 
renting of music and software, consumers can enjoy the 
renting of movies.242  Bobbs-Merrill worked under several 
theories of intellectual property. It curbed the anti-
competitive behavior of copyright producers (then book 
publishers) attempting to avoid or control competition in 
secondary markets through price discrimination (i.e., keep 
used books from being too cheap).  It also served to promote 
and preserve the delicate balance between producers and 
users, promoting availability of creative works.  Finally in a 
common law theory of property, it affirmed the common law 
aversion to restraints on alienation.  Bobbs-Merrill articu-
lated and fashioned the first sale doctrine by defining the 
 241. Id. at 350–51. 
 242. See The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2008). 
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right to vend (now distribute) as something less than an 
unlimited, unfettered right. It read into the statutory right 
this limitation, namely that the copyright holder exhausts its 
right to control vending (distributing) after a transfer of 
lawful possession (updated in 1976 Act to use term “first 
sale”). 
Bobbs-Merrill does not work under the relatively recent 
theory of “property rights” discussed supra.  In fact the price 
discrimination model enshrined by the “property rights” 
model runs absolutely contrary to the facts and holding of 
Bobbs-Merrill.  Also, the reference to “property” values by the 
model is misleading as its true focus is its exclusive reliance 
on the role of markets and the holy sanctity of “private 
ordering” (i.e., contract) to motivate, incentivize and reward 
the investors of copyrighted works.  This misapprehension, 
intentional or not, has continued in the courts by convincing 
themselves that under the cover of contract “it’s only a right 
among parties.”  Is it really a contract, when the boiler plate, 
pre-printed document (read: notice), is affixed to a copy-
righted work and found binding on a third party reseller? 
Where is the distinction from the situation in Bobbs-Merrill 
where Macy’s, the retailer, attempted to re-sell the book in 
violation of the publisher’s printed notice in the cover of the 
book.243  It is the fiction of contract; the principles of “mutual 
assent” and “privity” are assumed. 
B. Platt and American International Pictures Scrutinized 
Under Bobbs-Merrill 
In Part II, this Article argued that Platt and AIP II laid 
the groundwork for a copyright analysis of inherent rights 
grounded in a “property rights” theory of copyright.  Arguably 
the language in the opinions supported that premise.  As 
discussed supra, the Second Circuit spoke louder than 
necessary for the needs of the case before it.  The special 
treatment of intellectual property espoused in the opinion 
supported the particular holding of the decision.  The Second 
Circuit compelled the unpaid manufacturer to seek 
adjudication of its claim before disposing of the copyrighted 
articles.  In AIP II, however, there was stronger evidence that 
the Fifth Circuit meant to carry the principles of Platt further 
 243. See Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350–51. 
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and endow the copyright holder with special rights, rights 
arguably stronger than Bobbs-Merrill intended. 
Considering the principles espoused in Bobbs-Merrill 
particularly the references to alienation, full dominion 
and satisfactory price,244 one could infer a preference for 
finding as AIP I did. In the absence of evidence of theft or 
counterfeiting, the presumption should be that lawful 
transfer had occurred.  Otherwise, it would seem that a 
contrary holding, one similar to AIP II’s doctrine and holding, 
would support the contention of the publisher, Bobbs-Merrill, 
which the Court derisively referred to as (wrongly) assuming 
it had the right to determine how much of that right it parted 
with and how much it retained to itself.245  The reseller in AIP 
II had no more privity with the film producers than did 
Macy’s in the original Bobbs-Merrill decision.  Therefore, AIP 
II and Bobbs-Merrill are not in harmony. 
C. AIP I, Vernor I, and Softman Re-Rationalized Under 
Bobbs-Merrill 
Next, this section analyzes the decisions that found 
against the content producer/copyright holder decisions, AIP 
I, Vernor I, and Softman, in the context of the Bobbs-Merrill 
principles.  None of these decisions including AIP I closely 
followed or expressly relied on Bobbs-Merrill for their 
rationale and outcome.  These opinions would have been more 
persuasive if they had been more closely aligned with the 
principles of Bobbs-Merrill, which applied a copyright 
analysis supported by a “traditional incentives” theory of 
intellectual property.  These “minority view” decisions had 
fact patterns and outcomes consistent with Bobbs-Merrill. 
Bobbs-Merrill can be viewed as standing for four 
interdependent principles.  This section compares the 
analysis of these opinions to the rubric of the four 
 244. Id. at 350. 
 245. See id. at 349–50.  The Supreme Court stated “[i]t is the contention of 
the appellant that the Circuit Court erred in failing to give effect to the 
provision of Section 4952, protecting owners of the copyright in the sole right of 
vending the copyrighted book or other article, and the argument is that the 
statute vested the whole field of the right of exclusive sale in the copyright 
owner; that he can part with it to another to the extent that he sees fit, 
and may withhold to himself, by proper reservation, so much of the 
rights as he pleases.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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interdependent principles articulated by Bobbs-Merrill.  In its 
critique of these opinions, this Article also examines all of the 
opinions’ implicit or explicit reasoning in support of the 
“traditional incentives” theory of intellectual property.  The 
Court found in favor of the retailer, Macy’s, because all four 
had been satisfied.246  First, the Court found that Macy’s 
exercised full dominion over the copyrighted article, the novel 
“The Castaway.”247  There was no evidence that the publisher 
had rented or leased the novel with the obligation to return it 
after a finite period of time.248  Second, the Court found that 
Macy’s had paid a “satisfactory” price for the article.249  Third, 
its decision supported the alienation right generally preferred 
in common law; or stated conversely, a decision supporting 
the publisher would have constituted a restraint on 
alienation, disfavored generally in the common law.250  
Finally, the Court found no privity between the parties, which 
would have led to an analysis of a binding agreement that 
may have altered the above analysis.251  All three decisions 
that found against the copyright holder, film producer in AIP 
I, software producer in Softman and Vernor I, construed the 
first sale doctrine consistent with the principles outlined 
above.  In most cases, however, the principles have to be 
inferred from the factual circumstances and the holdings; the 
opinions did not expressly recite in full the Bobbs-Merrill’s 
analysis. 
In AIP I’s discussion of the life-of-print leases, the court 
raised principles one and two without making an explicit 
connection to Bobbs-Merrill.  Rather than cite or discuss 
Bobbs-Merrill, the district court cited another district court 
decision, sitting in the Second Circuit, for its exposition of the 
first sale doctrine.  The court found that the “single lump sum 
payment” and the fact that the “[customer] is not obligated to 
return [the film print]” left “little doubt but that, in reality, 
they are nothing more than sales.”252  AIP I emphasized the 
 246. See id. at 350–51. 
 247. Id. at 350. 
 248. Id. at 349–50. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See id. at 350. 
 251. Id. at 350–51. 
 252. Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman (AIP I), 400 F. Supp. 928, 932 (S.D. 
Ala. 1975). 
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third principle, the common law’s disfavor for restraints on 
alienation, by expressing its support for the principle that 
possession is lawful (in absence of contrary evidence).253  Lack 
of privity was not discussed in AIP I; neither contract 
analysis nor principles were invoked by AIP I or AIP II. 
AIP I devoted a great deal of its opinion to discussion of 
the policy concerns of a contrary result which would support 
the power of the copyright holder to retain title in its 
distribution practice.  Supporting the view that societal 
welfare is optimized by promoting access and availability of 
copyrighted articles, AIP I argued that its holding was 
“consistent with that policy of law which seeks to provide for 
free circulation of goods in commerce.”254  It also supported 
limitations on copyright holder’s power when it stated, 
“[f]urthermore, this allocation is consistent with the limited 
scope of the copyright proprietor’s statutory monopoly which 
‘reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public 
interest.’ ” 255  AIP I further demonstrated its support for the 
“traditional incentives” definition of societal welfare when it 
noted that: 
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but 
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music 
and other arts.  The practical and undesirable effects on 
“public availability” resulting from a ruling that all those 
in the defendant’s position are copyright infringers unless 
they can bear the burden of tracing their chain of title 
back to a “first sale” by the copyright proprietor are self-
evident (internal citations omitted).256 
AIP I focused more on its reliance on common law 
principles of tangible property.  AIP I did not make the 
analytical error of confusing contract analysis with copyright 
analysis; however, it failed to persuasively bring its copyright 
analysis under Bobbs-Merrill.  Rather than focus on a 
discussion of analogous common law property doctrines, it 
could have argued that its rationale and holding were 
consistent with Bobbs-Merrill’s principles, namely full 
dominion, satisfactory price, alienation and lack of privity. 
 253. See id. at 933. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 933–34. 
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Vernor I conducted a more strained analysis of precedent 
in the Ninth Circuit including Wise and MAI trio.  Relying on 
Wise, the court found that “the critical factor is whether the 
transferee required that the prints be returned” echoing the 
first principle of Bobbs-Merrill, exercising “full dominion” 
over the article.257  The fact pattern of Vernor I satisfied 
principle two of Bobbs-Merrill as there was no further 
obligation to pay for the software copy.  Vernor I’s reliance on 
Wise formed a shaky foundation for several reasons.  First, it 
could have been distinguished by the procedural posture of 
being a criminal prosecution, with a murky factual situation, 
and a court hesitant to find liability.  Next, Wise did not 
clearly articulate a doctrine which is probably why it was not 
that difficult for Vernor II to construe a very different reading 
of the opinion.  The analysis is as opaque as the factual 
situation; a great deal of the discussion focused on specific 
circumstances of each transaction which would evidence a 
contract analysis although it cited copyright doctrine as well.  
Vernor I failed to even reference Bobbs-Merrill. In its first 
sale doctrine analysis, it referenced the recent Supreme Court 
decision Quality King.258 
Vernor I did not expressly discuss the policy preference of 
an aversion to restraints on alienation; the holding, however, 
of Vernor I, finding for first sale, supported the Bobbs-Merrill 
principle of alienation.  The eBay brief in support of Timothy 
Vernor expressed its support for this principle arguing 
strongly that a finding of no first sale would have deleterious 
effects on secondary markets like its own.259 On the question 
of lack of privity, Vernor I expressly raised the lack of privity 
and mutual assent as problems for Autodesk’s argument that 
the license agreement bound the reseller from attempting to 
resell the software.  The court pointed to the apparent 
anomaly in Autodesk’s contract claim, when it stated, 
“[a]utodesk does not explain how a nontransferable license 
can bind subsequent transferees.”260 
 257. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. (Vernor I), 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170 
(W.D. Wash. 2008). 
 258. Id. at 1168. 
 259. See Brief for eBay, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (2010) (No. 09-35969), at 7–9. 
 260. See Vernor I, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (As the court noted, “[a]utodesk 
failed to surmount the thorny issues of privity and mutual assent inherent in its 
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Vernor I expressly disclaimed making policy judgments 
in its exercise of a mechanical construction of prior 
precedent.261  Its adoption and construction of prior precedent, 
however, followed the “traditional incentives” approach.  By 
construing Wise as finding “indefinite possession” dispositive, 
the court adhered to the rationale that (a) some limitation of 
copyright holder’s power is necessary for the proper 
functioning of copyright law and policy and (b) the promotion 
of secondary markets contributes to the societal welfare as 
justified by copyright law and policy. 
Softman’s opinion most closely expressed the Bobbs-
Merrill principles starting with principles one and two of “full 
dominion” and “satisfactory price.”  Softman argued that “if a 
transaction involves a single payment giving the buyer an 
unlimited period in which it has a right of possession, the 
transaction is a sale,” and first sale has been triggered.262  
Softman did not directly address the question of restraints on 
alienation although the factual circumstances and holding fit 
well with the Bobbs-Merrill model.  Like Macy’s the retailer 
of the books, the reseller Softman attempted to resell copies of 
software; however, the copyright holder, Adobe attempted to 
impose restrictions on the manner in which the articles would 
be resold. Adobe’s attempt to enforce a price discrimination 
model (educational vs. non-educational uses) was very similar 
to Bobbs-Merrill’s attempt to control the price of its 
downstream market.  Softman’s rejection of Adobe’s position 
was consistent with the Bobbs-Merrill decision. 
Although Softman did not expressly refer to a “lack of 
privity” in its opinion, it addressed rather the question of 
assent.  The court found no basis for assent by Softman to the 
terms of the Adobe license agreement by analyzing the facts 
that the reseller did not attempt to install or use the software 
product.263  Softman cited Bobbs-Merrill but not quite accu-
rately.  Bobbs-Merrill created the doctrine.  Softman argued 
contention that its License binds Mr. Vernor and his customers, it has ignored 
the terms of the License itself . . . .  Given the ‘nontransferable’ terms of the 
License, and Autodesk’s failure to cite authority for the proposition that the 
License binds downstream transferees, the court will not consider the issue 
further in this order.”). 
 261. See id. at 1174. 
 262. See SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 
(C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 263. See id. at 1087. 
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in several places in its opinion that the factual circumstances 
of the software transaction that included: (a) a single price 
and (b) indefinite term of possession, indicated a sale, thus 
invoking the first sale doctrine.264  The support for these 
statements was not Bobbs-Merrill but several articles and 
interestingly ProCD v. Zeidenberg.265  ProCD enforced the 
right of the software producer to incorporate price 
discrimination into its licensing strategy.  Softman’s reliance 
on ProCD only makes sense when considering the “Assent” 
section where the court in Softman found that in this case, 
Softman the reseller, neither installed nor operated the 
software so could not have assented to the software producer 
restrictions.266  This is where Softman went astray, like One 
Stop and Stargate, conflating contract and copyright 
analysis.267 
Softman expressly demonstrated its support for the 
“traditional incentives” theory in its discussion of the “public 
interest” test for injunctive relief.268  It was interesting that 
the opinion devoted discussion to this topic as the court had 
already held that there was no infringement. Nevertheless, 
its concern about unchecked power of copyright holders was 
expressed with some gravity.  First, the opinion noted that 
Adobe’s attempt to impose the terms of the EULA 
represented an effort to deprive customers of rights they 
should enjoy under copyright law and such restrictions were 
“inconsistent with the balance of rights set forth in 
intellectual property law.”269  In the next paragraph, Softman 
 264. See id. at 1085. 
 265. Id. at 1087. 
 266. Id. 
 267. SoftMan also relied on the article by David A. Rice entitled “Licensing 
the Use of Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale 
Doctrine.”  Professor Rice’s article relied heavily on its reading of Wise, namely 
that indefinite possession is dispositive of the first sale question, as well as 
analogous principles from tangible property law and UCC principles on the 
construction of leases and loan transactions.  See Rice, supra note 12, at 173–74.  
Wise has now been essentially overruled by Vernor II, and as this Article 
argued, it never provided a strong foundation for the broad construction of the 
first sale doctrine.  Reliance on analogous principles from property law or UCC 
was an inferior strategy to relying on the authority that is supreme both in 
hierarchy and subject matter, namely the Bobbs-Merrill rationale.  See supra 
notes 234–43 and accompanying text. 
 268. See SoftMan, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1090–91. 
 269. Id. at 1090. 
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makes several references to the “unlimited” and “unchecked” 
power that software producers attempt to exert in the 
marketplace.270  Softman clearly supported a “traditional 
incentives” theory of intellectual property with the 
concomitant belief that limits on copyright holder’s power are 
important for the optimal societal welfare. Softman’s 
argument would have been strengthened by an explicit 
reliance on Bobbs-Merrill. 
D. Vernor II Versus Bobbs-Merrill 
Applying the Bobbs-Merrill principles to Vernor II, it 
would at first glance appear that they are in conflict and 
cannot be reconciled.  Just like AIP II, there was no privity 
between the software reseller, Timothy Vernor, and 
Autodesk.  An outcome for Timothy Vernor would also appear 
to satisfy the principles of Bobbs-Merrill.  He had indefinite 
possession of the article, which would appear to satisfy the 
principle of “full dominion.”  He also had paid a satisfactory 
price and had no further obligation for payments.  Finally, an 
outcome in his favor would support the common law’s 
aversion to restraints against alienation. 
The question, however, of whether a software user 
exercises “full dominion” may be more complex than in the 
case of other copyrighted articles including digital media such 
as an e-book, CD or DVD.  Quite often, the relationship 
between software producer and user is not static but 
dynamic.  By that I mean that licensing of software often 
involves the continuing license of software in the form of 
updates and fixes.  Conceptually it can be said then that 
there is no exhaustion as long as there is a continuing license 
of copyrightable material to the user.  This point is discussed 
below in the next section.  For this reason, the proposed 
model includes a special exception for software if it satisfies 
the condition of a continuing license of copyrighted material 
to the user/licensee. 
 
 270. See id. at 1091 (The court warned that “Adobe seeks a vast and 
seemingly unlimited power to control prices and all channels of distribution  
. . . . A system of ‘licensing’ which grants software publishers this degree of 
unchecked power to control the market deserves to be the object of careful 
scrutiny.” (emphasis added)). 
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E. Software is Special 
In the case of software, there has been the general 
problem, identified by many others, that the legal regime is 
ill-suited to appropriately protect (on both ends of the 
protection spectrum) the innovation.271 Software is 
structurally different from all other forms of creative works 
that fall under copyright protection.272  The value of the 
program is not in the text or language of the program; it is in 
the behavior or function of the program.273  It is what the 
program can do for the user that gives it commercial and 
utilitarian value.  The problem, both commercial and 
conceptual, is that the value of the software that is derived 
from genuine creative and innovative effort is vulnerable to 
theft by a competitor. 
It is helpful to understand the value equation.  The same 
software code, or text, can be used by a customer in a wide 
range of uses, with a corresponding business value.  
Depending on the configuration and installation of the 
software, the value to the customer, as reflected in the 
bargain struck by the producer and customer for the price of 
the licensed use, can easily range from $100,000 to multi-
million dollars for the same text, the same software code.  If a 
competitor gained access to the software, it could easily 
determine the competitive functional aspects of the software 
and unfairly benefit from the innovation of the original 
software producer/developer.  A competitor may do this 
legally or illegally (i.e., violating current copyright norms).  
As the software producer knows it will be difficult to detect if 
that has occurred, and it will necessarily involve a time-
consuming and costly process to effectively stop the activity 
through injunctive relief and/or damages.  Under the current 
copyright regime, there is no protection for the behavior of the 
 271. See generally J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools — The Outer 
Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 797 (1992); 
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) [hereinafter A Manifesto]; 
Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 
1025, 1148–54 (1990); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against 
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 
DUKE L.J. 663, 762–69 (1984). 
 272. See A Manifesto, supra note 271, at 2318–19. 
 273. See id. at 2318. 
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program so the competitor may very well legally obtain the 
valuable, competitive aspects of the program.  For very 
rational reasons, software producers have attempted to 
combat that vulnerability by controlling the access, use and 
location of their software code.  Software producers have 
taken measures to restrict the transfer rights of the software 
user to prevent access by competitors to the software, a direct 
impact on the first sale doctrine of copyright. 
In 1994, Professor Pamela Samuelson and three others 
published A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs.274  A Manifesto proposed a “market-
oriented legal regime” aimed at protecting against cloning of 
program behavior and other industrial design elements of 
software.275  Professor Samuelson et al. argued that the 
current copyright regime was both over-protective and under-
protective.  By protecting substantial similarity of the text of 
computer software, the more valuable parts of the computer 
program, referred to as the behavior of the program, were 
often not protected.276  However, the parts of the program that 
were protected, namely the “text” or language of the program, 
received far greater protection than was necessary to 
incentivize innovation and likely led to market destructive 
effects.277 
A Manifesto recommended a two part solution.  The first 
part, the anti-cloning protection, would essentially provide 
the developer with lead time protection in order to incentivize 
its investment in innovation but without causing some of the 
market destructive effects of overprotection.278  Although the 
article avoided either committing to a judicial or legislative 
solution, or a proposed timeframe, it was clear that they 
supported something significantly shorter than protection 
under current copyright regime, probably three to five 
years.279  The article hinted that software developers may be 
motivated to lobby Congress for such a legislative solution, 
but, in the alternative, they analogized a common law 
approach to the unfair competition “hot news” doctrine 
 274. See id. at 2308. 
 275. Id. at 2412–20. 
 276. Id. at 2347–56. 
 277. Id. at 2356–61. 
 278. Id. at 2413–14. 
 279. Id. at 2408. 
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fashioned nearly a century ago by the Supreme Court.280  The 
second part of their proposal was a registration system 
whereby developers could register those elements of the 
program that had benefited from the anti-cloning protection 
to some form of licensing scheme.281  Again, the article 
avoided a firm commitment on options, but several 
possibilities from voluntary to compulsory licensing, including 
the hybrid of the current music collectives in the U.S, were 
discussed.282 
In the evaluation of the three options that the article 
proposed between “do nothing” and their full fledged proposal, 
it appears that the order of things followed the “do nothing” 
option, as far as the development of a special legal regime (or 
common law rule) for software.283  A Manifesto anticipated 
this possibility by noting that software companies may 
believe that they have accomplished what they need in the 
regulatory framework with a combination of copyright, patent 
and trade secret protection.284  They have also benefited from 
the “property rights” theory approach in the evolution of 
judicial doctrine of the copyright privileges of first sale, fair 
use and the essential copying doctrine.  By successfully 
convincing the courts that the instrument of the license 
agreement (EULA) sanctifies the characterization of the 
transaction as one between a licensor/copyright owner and a 
licensee/user, rather than “owner” of a copy, software 
producers have achieved high level of control over their 
intellectual property. 
Relying on a 1992 report by the former Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment,285 A Manifesto noted the 
dangers of not addressing the specific needs of software by 
the legal regime: 
[It] may be easier for Congress to achieve a proper balance 
in policy objectives through a sui generis approach to 
software protection than could be achieved through use of 
 280. Id. at 2423–24. 
 281. Id. at 2426. 
 282. Id. at 2427–29. 
 283. Id. at 2421–22. 
 284. Id. at 2421. 
 285. See CONG. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, OTA-TCT-527, FINDING A BALANCE: 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 26–27 (1992). 
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existing legal regimes wherein changes in scope of 
protection to accommodate software might distort 
principles of protection as applied to other 
categories of works.286 
A central tenet of this Article is that the judicial doctrine 
has evolved to accommodate software and in the process it 
has distorted the important principles of Bobbs-Merrill with 
respect to the first sale doctrine.  This trend line began with 
ProCD and its conflation of privity and assent combined with 
strong adherence to the “property rights” theory and economic 
model of price discrimination.  Bowers continued ProCD 
approach adopting the imaginary privity concept. 
By ignoring the absence of privity, the courts granted 
wide berth to copyright holder’s ability to dictate whether the 
copyright law privileges, such as first sale, fair use or 
essential copying, existed by decreeing that they do not.  In 
the case of the first sale doctrine, as has been discussed 
supra, the Ninth Circuit has now decreed that a copyright 
holder can control the terms of ownership, including the 
question of transfer of title.  Such limitations on the right of a 
purchaser of a copy of software to sell, lend or otherwise 
dispose of such copy, as specified by the terms of the EULA 
(read: notice) affixed to the product, travels with the product 
to whomever may obtain it (lawfully) in the stream of 
commerce.  Now the pivot. 
The special nature of software has moved the courts to 
favor the software producers.  In Stargate, the court notably 
called for “enhanced copyright protection” for software: 
This Court notes that software is unique from other 
forms of copyrighted information.  Technology and 
software, in particular, has radically transformed the way 
information is created and exchanged.  Software 
fundamentally differs from more traditional forms 
of medium, such as print or phonographic materials, in 
that software can be both, more readily and easily copied 
on a mass scale in an extraordinarily short amount of time 
 286. A Manifesto, supra note 271, 2313–14 (emphasis added).  It is 
interesting to note that Professor Goldstein wrote favorably about a sui generis 
approach to software in both his 1994 and 2003 editions of his book, Copyright’s 
Highway.  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 215–16; PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 199 
(2003). 
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and relatively inexpensively.  One of the primary 
advantages of software, its ability to record, concentrate 
and convey information with unprecedented ease and 
speed, makes it extraordinarily vulnerable to illegal 
copying and piracy.  This Court finds that it is important 
to acknowledge these special characteristics of the 
software industry and provide enhanced copyright 
protection for its inventors and developers.287 
Applying the conceptual framework that where the 
software producer continues to license copyrighted material 
to the user, exhaustion has not occurred, then it follows that 
the software producer may rightfully control the distribution 
such that first sale doctrine would not apply.  Next, the 
article concludes with a brief summary of the “constructive 
ownership” model, which incorporates the special case of 
software. 
F. Proposed Model of “Constructive Ownership” 
As digital commerce becomes more pervasive in 
mainstream culture, society is at an inflection point where 
questions of the balance of the protection-access paradigm are 
critically important.  Current trends with e-readers, such as a 
Kindle or Nook, mp3 players, such as the iPod, already have 
limited the traditional first sale rights that the public had 
enjoyed in the pre-digital world since Bobbs-Merrill.  These 
digital devices are structured such that the consumer/user 
has “indefinite possession” of the works on the device but no 
rights of ownership including first sale.  The distinction 
between possession and ownership requires greater scrutiny 
and discussion because of the serious implications for access 
and availability of creative works in the digital culture.  The 
critical factor distinguishing the “traditional incentives” 
theory from the “property rights” theory on the first sale 
question is that of “possession.”  The former view takes 
umbrage with the assumption that “indefinite possession” is 
not equivalent to a transfer of title and essentially a trigger of 
the first sale.  Conversely, “property rights” theorists would 
not find an analytical problem with “indefinite possession” 
and no effective transfer of title. 
 287. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1059 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (emphasis added). 
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I propose a new model under a theory of “constructive 
ownership” whereby the first sale doctrine is updated for the 
digital era.  The model builds on the “rightful possessor” 
theory embraced by the “minority” view of the courts, but 
adds a third prong specifically for the special case of software.  
The first two prongs come from those minority decisions and 
commentary discussed supra, namely (a) no obligation for 
continuing payment or as Bobbs-Merrill stated “a satisfactory 
price” and (b) no obligation to return the article or as Bobbs-
Merrill stated “acquired full dominion” over the article.  The 
third prong would be (c) in the case of computer programs (i.e. 
software), no continuing license of copyrighted material by 
the copyright holder.  This reflects the special case of 
software.  Conceptually there is no exhaustion where the 
software producer continues to license updates and fixes to 
the computer program. 
This model of “constructive ownership” would be 
consistent with principles of Bobbs-Merrill and the 
“traditional incentives” theory that assumes the importance 
of balancing protection with access as justified by the 
Constitution.  As Professor Samuelson wrote over twenty 
years ago, the first sale doctrine had been “drafted [in the 
statute] more narrowly than its common law roots would 
have predicted.”288  The Supreme Court, in its 1908 Bobbs-
Merrill decision, reset the balance between the copyright 
holders and the public; the proposal for a “constructive 
ownership” approach to the first sale doctrine offers the 
possibility of a new millennium recalibration of the first sale 
judicial doctrine to fit the digital culture of the 21st century.  
The implications of the “constructive ownership” model would 
be drawing a line between software distribution (assuming 
there is a continuing license of copyright), and the 
distribution of digital media, including books, music and 
other traditional creative works.  The latter would be subject 
to the first sale doctrine, allowing the user to freely transfer 
their copies.289 
 288. See Samuelson, supra note 56, at 197. 
 289. The significant caveat here is that the anti-circumvention provisions of 
the Digital Millennium Act of 1998 still provide content producers with a 
mechanism to “lock in” content.  The narrow application of this model would 
imply that courts would not apply Vernor II to the distribution of tangible 
DVD’s and CD’s even if the packaging included a EULA similar to that used by 
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CONCLUSION 
All of the software decisions, whether they favored or 
disfavored the software producer, on the question of first sale 
doctrine are best understood through the prism of the 
underlying theory for copyright justification.  The pro-
software decisions are best rationalized by their adherence, 
claimed or unclaimed, to the “property rights” theory.  
Relying on the 1970’s economic theory of Harold Demsetz and 
buttressed by a “natural rights” justification as articulated by 
Professor Goldstein, “property rights” adherents have no 
patience for other values in copyright other than maximum 
control over the property by the owner and the sanctity of 
markets as an instrument in the hands of the owner of such 
property. 
The courts and Congress have become strong “property 
rights” adherents.290  The courts have attempted to distract 
the focus of their rationales and outcomes from copyright 
theory.  Under the cover of flawed contract reasoning, the 
courts argued that their decisions were “between parties” and 
not “a right against the world.”  The logic is fatally flawed.  If 
a copyright holder slaps a EULA (read: notice) on to the 
packaging of a DVD, then puts such DVD into the stream of 
global commerce, its rights are against the conceivably 
millions of consumers who purchase that DVD around the 
world.  The trend began with ProCD and Bowers finding 
privity where it didn’t exist, resulting in a subterfuge for the 
real work that was going on.  The transformation of copyright 
law has occurred from one justified by “traditional 
Autodesk in Vernor II.  Tackling the effect of the digital locks sanctioned by the 
DMCA on the first sale doctrine is another project. 
 290. See supra notes 59–96 and accompanying text (discussion of 
Congressional enactment of § 117 and the courts’ construction of the statute).  
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has largely been considered a legislative 
victory for copyright industries.  See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of 
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2201 
(2000) (noting that copyright scholars “argue that the rushed, industry backed 
DMCA is very deeply flawed.”).  See also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations 
Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).  In his book, Wired 
Shut, Tarleton Gillespie noted that “in statutes like the DMCA, this logic is 
used not just to tip the copyright scales toward corporate owners, but to 
construct and stabilize particular arrangements of cultural distribution that 
work hand in hand with these interests, and often against the public welfare.”  
TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT 197 (MIT 2007). 
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incentives,” as articulated by the decisions of AIP I, SoftMan, 
and (weakly) Vernor I, to one justified by “property rights,” as 
articulated by AIP II, Harmony, ISC-Bunker, One Stop, 
Stargate, and finally the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernor II. 
The courts have shaped judicial doctrine to accommodate 
software and in the process distorted the important principles 
of Bobbs-Merrill. Bobbs-Merrill’s rationale and outcome 
supported the “traditional incentives” approach to copyright, 
namely that societal welfare is maximized by the proper 
balance between protection of the copyrighted work and the 
public’s access to copyrighted works.  In Bobbs-Merrill, the 
Supreme Court clearly argued against absolute control by the 
copyright holder of the distribution of its copyrighted works.  
The implication of the “property rights” evolution of the 
judicial doctrine is clearly a severe restriction in the public’s 
access to copyrighted works.  The proposed “constructive 
ownership” model attempts to recalibrate judicial doctrine to 
be consistent with the important value to society of promoting 
the balance between protection to the copyright holder and 
the public’s access to copyrighted works. 
 
